

RUTH SLADE


THE
BELGIAN
CONGO

With an additional chapter
by MARJORY TAYLOR

LONDON
INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

*Purchased with funds provided by
The Estate of Louis H. Brush
In Memory of his Father
Professor James Alpheus Brush
Librarian of Mount Union College
1869-1873*



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

THE BELGIAN CONGO

The Institute of Race Relations is an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1958 to encourage and facilitate the study of the relations between races. The Institute is precluded by the Memorandum and Articles of its incorporation from expressing an opinion on any aspect of the relations between races. Any opinions expressed in this work are not therefore those of the Institute.

✓

THE BELGIAN CONGO

RUTH SLADE

WITH AN ADDITIONAL CHAPTER

by

MARJORY TAYLOR

JOHN J. HONORABLE LIBRARY
ALLIANCE, OHIO

SECOND EDITION

*Issued under the auspices of the
Institute of Race Relations, London*

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON NEW YORK CAPE TOWN

1961

msl

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4

GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI KUALA LUMPUR

CAPE TOWN IBADAN NAIROBI ACCRA

© *Institute of Race Relations* 1960, 1961

First edition 1960

Second edition 1961

967.5
S631b
92367

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

I. PATERNALISM	1
II. AFRICAN DISCONTENT	8
III. THE BELGIAN ANSWER	18
(a) GOVERNMENT ACTION	18
(b) NON-GOVERNMENT MOVES	33
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO, 1954-58	39
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO, 1958-59	44
VI. APRIL 1959 TO 30 JUNE 1960	56

MAPS

1. The Belgian Congo superimposed on Europe .	<i>page</i> vii
2. The Belgian Congo as part of Africa	vii
3. The Belgian Congo	viii

DR. SLADE's longer study of the Belgian Congo, which is in progress, and the visit to the Congo from which this booklet has resulted, have been made possible by the generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation, to whom her thanks and those of the Institute of Race Relations are due.



MAP 1. The Congo superimposed on Europe



MAP 2. The Congo as part of Africa



MAP 3. The Belgian Congo.

I. PATERNALISM

The Isolation of the Congo from the Rest of Africa

FOR long the Congo appeared to be a peaceful island untouched by African anti-colonialism. Even the maps produced in Belgium seem designed to convey this impression of an isolated island fortress; often they give only the sharp outline of that immense square of Central Africa, with its two tapering additions, the one pushing West to provide an outlet to the Atlantic, and the other South-eastward down into the Copperbelt. Then on the Eastern border they show the Belgian trusteeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi adjoining the Congo like an afterthought. Apart from this, however, there is little indication that it is not water which surrounds the Congo, but other African territories. From the maps they see in the schoolroom most Belgian children would be able to draw a passable outline sketch of their country's colony, but there would probably be few who could set it in its African surroundings.

Until recently, of course, the need to place the Congo in relation to its African context was not particularly apparent; only now has this become inescapable. Theoretically the evolution of the Congo was to have taken place in a logical succession of slow and easy stages; mass education was to provide a literate population before the education of an *élite* was considered, and a long apprenticeship in consultative councils was to prepare the way for democratic institutions at some remote date. At the same time a system of social welfare and the gradual creation of an African middle class provided satisfaction for the immediate future, and it was thought that a calm and peaceful discussion of economic and political emancipation could safely be relegated to some distant period. Theoretically the plan was perfect; and if the

isolation of the Congo from the rest of the continent could have continued indefinitely it might have met with an outstanding success.

For thirty years international opinion was indifferent, and African opinion within the Congo a negligible factor, uninfluenced by native opinion elsewhere. Undisturbed by either, Belgian empiricism prudently followed the path of economic development and increasing social prosperity. In 1939 the threefold foundation of Belgian authority in the Congo—the State, the companies, and the Church—was unassailed and apparently unassailable. The State official, the capitalist, and the missionary worked hand in hand to lead the Congo—eighty times the size of Belgium—forward along the highroad of civilization and progress. As Governor-General Ryckmans said: ‘Rule in order to serve. . .’ This is the sole excuse for colonial conquest; it is also its complete justification. To serve Africa—that means to civilize her.¹ The civilization of her African colony—seen largely in terms of technical progress, native welfare, and the introduction of Christianity—had been put forward as the conscious aim and ideal of Belgium ever since she took over the Congo Independent State from Leopold II in 1908. In contrast to the earlier period of outright exploitation there were, between annexation and the outbreak of war in 1939, three decades of benevolent paternalism.

A Civilizing Mission

The Europeans had come to the conclusion that their exploitation of the natural resources and the labour which made up the wealth of the Congo basin ought to be justified by evidence of the benefits which Africans were receiving from contacts with them—benefits in terms of a settled life, reasonable housing conditions, enough to eat, and access to the spiritual resources of Christendom. It was evident that her African colony was bringing wealth to Belgium; in return, the Belgian task was to transmit Western civilization

¹ P. Ryckmans, *Dominer pour servir*, Brussels, 1931.

to the Congo. It was the latter aspect that was stressed during this period. The economic reason for Belgium's interest in the Congo was barely mentioned; the whites had become the 'tutors' of the Africans, they were keenly aware of a civilizing mission which it was their duty to fulfil and they loudly proclaimed their consciousness of 'the white man's burden'. In the phrase of M. Pierre Ryckmans, '*dominer pour servir*'.

The Africans had not been asked to express their opinions on the subject of the introduction of Western civilization; it was assumed that they would be glad enough of the change once they discovered that they were to be compensated for the inconveniences—such as forced labour—by an improvement in their material conditions of life. There was no idea, during these years, of 'equality' between black and white; it seemed abundantly evident that the relationship between European and African could only be that of benefactor and recipient. The 'Prospero complex' had developed easily enough among the Europeans.¹ 'You are my father and my mother', a phrase often used by Africans in addressing a European administrator or missionary, expressed very well their sense of dependence upon the invaders who were changing the old patterns of tribal society with frightening speed. As in the old society a man was dependent upon his ancestors and their spokesman, his chief, so now he had transferred his dependence to the new powers in the land, the whites to whom even the hereditary chiefs owed obedience. And in fact for long the father-son relationship seemed satisfactory enough. Relations between black and white continued simple and uniform. Few could have predicted the development of a complex situation such as that of the present day, in which Europeans are in contact not only with rural Africans still more or less supported by their traditional institutions, but also with the students of the two universities, and with those at every stage between the two

¹ O. Mannoni, *Psychologie de la colonisation*, Paris, 1950, translated as *Prospero and Caliban*, Methuen, London, 1956.

extremes, for some of whom 'paternalism' has come to be the most irritating aspect of the colonial system.

Paternalism, the Traditional Policy

In the pre-war Congo paternalism had paid, and had produced practical results remarkable in Africa. When the great concessionary companies—*Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*, *Forminière*, *Huilleries du Congo Belge* among the most important—found it necessary to concentrate thousands of men around the mines, tearing them away from their traditional tribal backgrounds, it was good business to provide accommodation for their families, to give them food, clothing, medical care and social amenities, the pastoral solicitude of a Catholic mission, and an educational system for their children. To look after the workers and their families from the cradle to the grave was the best way to keep the labour supply healthy and contented, to avoid industrial disputes, and to encourage labour stability. This thorough-going and intelligent paternalism of the companies had produced impressive material results. What it had *not* done, however, was to leave anything to the initiative of the Africans. The danger was that this businesslike attitude risked treating the African workers as something less than men. 'See how well we look after our cattle,' remarked a paternalist of the Katanga as he proudly displayed the schools, the hospital, the maternity centre, and the sports ground of one of his camps.¹

After the War, a few warning voices began to be raised:

'The social question, in Congo as in Belgium, is something other than the multiplication of clinics and of swimming pools or a distribution of alms. If tomorrow all the squalid huts that remain in the workers' quarters could be removed, water and electricity laid on, family allowances and social insurance extended, and wages and living stan-

¹ A. A. J. van Bilsen, 'Un plan de trente ans pour l'émancipation politique de l'Afrique belge', in *Les dossiers de l'Action Sociale Catholique*, Brussels, 1950.

dards raised, the European companies would have done their duty, but the industrialized native would be very little happier. The object of paternalist policy is to make him someone who is assisted, insured and pensioned, instead of making him a free man; the person is sacrificed to the individual. Each native is provided with his standardized house, mass-produced furniture, pre-determined scale of food, his free time regulated to the last detail and without a trace of imagination; on top of which, to stop him making an unwise use of his money, a part of his wages is replaced by payment in kind. Man is turned into a sort of vegetable, in an anticipation of the mechanical earthly paradise of Bernanos. But at all times, men have found freedom in misery preferable to a comfortable slavery. A certain paternalism vis-à-vis the African in the Congo will doubtless be inevitable for a considerable time to come, but we must remember that liberty which has once been taken away is difficult to give back. We must begin at once with the task of deproletarianizing the native worker and giving him his freedom by progressively causing him to participate himself in the improvement of his conditions of life and in the administration of the work camps, in preparation for the day, inevitably still long distant, when he will be able to take part in the direction of the concern itself. The function of the camp leader is not, as most people still imagine, to be the brain of the native worker, but rather to teach the latter to be able to do without him. The object which we seek, after all, is the native's own happiness, and a man can only receive his true happiness at his own hands.¹

The paternalism of the Government had been as practical as that of the capitalists. It had concentrated on the material well-being of the masses and the provision of primary education, with the idea that this policy would be more likely to ensure a contented population than would the granting of political rights and the formation of an *élite*. Secondary

¹ G. Malengreau, *La Revue Nouvelle*, V, no. 2, February 1947, p. 101.

education (apart from the training of African priests) had been adapted to the immediate needs of the country, to the production of clerks, nurses, and so on, while Africans had not been admitted to the liberal professions nor to university education. Hospitals and clinics, social centres and housing schemes, the inspection of working conditions and the regulation of wages, had together provided a background of social welfare in the Congo. There had emerged what might loosely be termed an African middle class, composed of clerks, railway employees, medical assistants, mechanics, chauffeurs, and the like. These men had good, regular jobs, comparatively well paid (although not in relation to the salaries of Europeans), and were for the present satisfied with their lot. The classic exchange between an African of Brazzaville and an African of Leopoldville puts it very well: 'I am a French citizen; you are merely a subject.' 'But I am a rich man; you are poor.'

The Limitations of Paternalism

Good economic conditions for the emerging middle class, a comprehensive social legislation, and an educational system for the masses were not everything. As against the positive achievements in the social and economic fields, there were large gaps in other directions. The Congolese had been given no political responsibilities, no *élite* capable of leadership had been formed, very few had been sent to study abroad, any potential politico-religious agitators had been transported far from home, a strict censorship of the Press prevented the free expression of opinion, and no Africans had been admitted to the higher government positions. There was, moreover, a very real racial discrimination; in the fields of education, medical services, and housing Africans and Europeans were treated as two totally separated communities—a distinction said to be justified on social and cultural grounds. So far as votes were concerned, however, the Europeans were in no better position than the Africans. The Belgian Congo had been developed as a black country,

supervised by a restricted group of whites who received their instructions in detail from Brussels. As far as possible, the emergence of 'poor whites' had been discouraged, and Europeans, like the Africans, had enjoyed no political rights. The basic assumption of this policy in the Congo had been as follows: that given a fair degree of material prosperity, and as little evidence as possible of discrimination—as in the matter of votes, for example—and given religious training (at this period most atheist or agnostic Socialists appear to have thought the existence of the missions necessary and useful) and protection from Brussels against the Europeans on the spot, the Africans would be content for the colonial régime to continue indefinitely. This attitude remained unchanged after the War. When Governor-General Ryckmans left the Colony to represent Belgium on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations he said to his former colleagues in the administration:

'If I had to leave you a last message, I would say that the function of the State is to create and guarantee man's happiness, and that the prosperity of a country is that of the great mass of its inhabitants, and that Belgium will have succeeded in her colonial task when our natives live happily under our flag.'

II. AFRICAN DISCONTENT

The Breakdown of Isolation

WHAT the Belgians had not taken into account was the fact that the Congo was not going to be left in isolation to proceed tranquilly along this path of material prosperity in strict subordination to Brussels. This policy had been a positive and workable one while the Congo had existed as a world on its own, and as long as the Europeans, as well as the Africans, had been denied political rights. The Second World War broke abruptly into this neatly designed pattern. The horizons of the Congolese were rapidly widened as a result of African troops serving abroad in Egypt, the Middle East, and Burma. Sometimes their relationships with Europeans were suddenly reversed; in the dignity of military uniform some had guarded poorly-clad white soldiers and fired on them if they tried to escape. Others had slept with white prostitutes; 'this,' said one, 'was *the* great crisis of my life, and I can never think of Europeans in the same way again'. In the Congo itself, the Africans had observed American Negroes being treated as the equals of white troops. Propaganda against Nazi racial doctrines had been used in order to stimulate the war effort in the Congo and to speed up the collection of rubber and the production of vital minerals.

The Post-war Situation

As a result of the War, not only did European prestige in the Congo decline but there was less personal contact between Europeans and Africans than there had been

before. The officials of the administration had been obliged to give their attention to the problems of the war-time production of rubber and minerals, and thus had tended to neglect native policy. The Europeans in general had been exhausted by their prolonged stay in the tropics and by the efforts demanded of them during the War. Moreover, they tended to have their wives and families with them and, unlike the bachelor colonists of earlier years, stayed at home in the evenings instead of seeking African society. At the end of the War many Congolese were complaining somewhat bitterly that 'the whites don't like us any more'.¹

Not only was there a decline in personal contacts between white and black, but the Europeans on their side were beginning to agitate for greater autonomy for the Congo. They had lived through a period of isolation from metropolitan Belgium and, so far as they were concerned, they saw no reason why the links with Brussels should ever be so close again. It was not so much that they wanted to send their votes home, as they had seen the American soldiers doing; they were less interested in metropolitan politics than in the shaping of policy in the Congo itself. From their point of view, the Central Government showed too great a partiality for the Africans. 'We can deal with the blacks; we know them. Brussels can only theorize,' was their attitude.

The social dislocation resulting from the rush to the towns made the situation in the Congo at the end of the War all the more uneasy. The economic effort of the war years had been intense. The Africans of the interior had been hard pressed by the compulsory labour demanded of them, and there had been a considerable movement towards the cities. The population of Leopoldville, 40,000 in 1939, had grown to nearly 100,000 by 1945. In 1938 8.3 per cent. of the total population lived in the *centres extra-coutumiers* (urban or mining centres outside the traditional areas); by 1946 the

¹ G. Malengreau, 'Recent Developments in Belgian Africa', in *Africa Today*, ed. C. Grove Haines, Baltimore, 1955, p. 340.

percentage had risen to 14.9. And in the towns the growing discontent spread rapidly.

There had been several indications that the pre-war calm was not going to last for ever, and that the Africans were beginning to feel that their collective strength could be a match for European force. In 1941 there occurred the strike of *Union Minière* employees and rioting at Elisabethville, and in 1944 came the revolt of a group of soldiers of the *Force Publique* at Luluabourg, followed in 1945 by strikes and rioting at Matadi. These signs of unrest had been dealt with firmly and easily, and they were, after all, only more or less isolated local incidents.

The Influence of Post-war Developments in the Rest of Africa

It was no longer possible, however, to insulate the Congo against influences from outside. The political life of Brazzaville can hardly fail to affect Leopoldville, since the two capitals are separated only by a strip of water. The prestige of Nasser grew rapidly, especially in the East, always susceptible to Arab influences, where many Congolese listen avidly to the Kiswahili programmes of Cairo Radio. The independence of Ghana in 1956, and the nationalist movements in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia were bound to affect the Congo, while European attitudes in the Union of South Africa and in Kenya gradually became better known there and aroused increasingly unfavourable reactions. Moreover, the different status of Ruanda-Urundi as a trusteeship territory tended to encourage comparisons between Belgian policy there and in the Congo. Responsible Congolese are ready enough to admit all that benevolent paternalism had done for the Congo, but they cannot remain unaffected by the desire for autonomy being manifested all over the continent. There has been a growing realization in the Congo that good government is not the same as self-government, and that in our day the one cannot take the place of the other for anything more than a limited period. It is a principle of which all the colonial nations, and

Belgium notably among them, are continually being reminded by the growing body of anti-colonial opinion finding expression in the United Nations Organization.

Emergence of the Évolués

By the end of the War in 1945 it was, of course, only a very few Congolese—mainly among those in the towns—who were ready to take an interest in what was happening in other parts of Africa. These were the *évolués*, as they began to be called, Africans who had received more education than their fellows and could speak French with fair ease, had renounced polygamy, and were comparatively well-off—the ‘middle class’ whose creation Belgian policy had encouraged.

Racial Discrimination

It was these men who at the end of the War were beginning to compare their position with that of the Europeans, and to ask the reason for the great gulf which existed between white and black. They were turning their backs on traditional Bantu society, and saw their best hope for the future in assimilation to the Western way of life. It was an overwhelming disappointment to them when they became aware of the attitude of the great majority of the Europeans towards their aspirations, expressed in such modified forms of the colour bar as were beginning to make themselves felt in the Congo, especially in the sphere of social relations. They became aware that while the whites had taken seriously their task as ‘tutors’, had striven in various ways to introduce new and Western forms of culture, and to a certain extent to europeanize the Africans, there was a point at which they seemed determined that the process should stop. When it came to inviting Africans to a meal, to buying meat at the same butcher’s shop, to travelling next to an African in the train, to letting their children sit on the same school benches as young Africans, to the great bitterness of the *évolués* the Europeans objected. All had been well as long as the Africans

had remained as children who were to be taught and encouraged and gradually persuaded to change what appeared to the Europeans to be the more barbarous of their habits. But the limit was reached at the adolescent stage, when Africans began to want to be treated on terms of equality, as adults, to be regarded as brothers rather than as sons, and when small but increasingly vocal groups of *évolués* began to criticize white paternalism and to demand that a completely new relationship should replace the old. As for the Europeans, this change in attitude for the most part genuinely puzzled them; they looked back in longing to the good old days when the 'boy' was entirely submissive to his master, and they much regretted the new state of affairs.

What made matters worse was that European attitudes in the social sphere seemed to be supported by the discrimination between white and black that was to be found in pre-war legislation. What had then been justified by the great differences between European and Bantu culture had lost its meaning when the way of life of certain Africans began to approach that of the whites. What had been reasonable social distinction became insupportable racial discrimination. For example, the sharp division between the European town and the *cité indigène* could not continue to be justified on hygienic grounds when the standards of hygiene in some African families were the same as those of the Europeans. In labour relations a paternalist structure had been necessary in earlier days to protect African workers who knew nothing of trade unions and industrial disputes, but with the birth of an African trade union movement, this was no longer the case after the War.¹ Payment in the form of lodging and

¹ It is true that this movement had been fostered largely by the white unions (Europeans had taken advantage of their war-time state of isolation from Brussels in order to unionize) which had seen African unions chiefly as a means of giving weight to the demands of European workers. Its growth was hindered both by the Africans' lack of knowledge of the objects and methods of trade unionism and also by governmental restrictions based on the apprehension that the formation of trade unions would have political repercussions.

rations had protected African workers who had been abruptly removed from village life to the mining camps; this became obsolete as soon as they demanded freedom to dispose of their wages as they wished. The distinctions in the penal code between native and non-native were beginning to seem irksome to some of the urbanized Congolese; Africans could be flogged, for example, while Europeans could not. Africans began to ask why it should be Europeans who represented native interests in the *Conseil de Gouvernement* and the *Conseils de Province*, why only the white minority should possess the right to be consulted about the affairs of the Colony. The *évolués* were becoming aware that the existing legal discrimination between European immigrants and the indigenous Africans gave the former a privileged position. They regarded this situation as unjustifiable, and refused to accept its indefinite continuation.

The Difficult Position of the Évolués

The situation in which the *évolués* found themselves was a particularly difficult one. They lived as it were between two worlds, that of the traditional Bantu culture and that of Western civilization. While they had a foot in each, they were really at home in neither. It was perhaps the seminarians who first felt the dichotomy with full force. An African immersed during term-time in a European rhythm of life, hemmed in by European discipline, following European studies in European categories, and eating semi-European food, would return during the holidays to share the life of his family in a small village where clocks, libraries, and European dress and food were unheard of, and where nobody would have the slightest idea about his mode of life during the rest of the year. Small wonder that he felt out of place in traditional tribal life, while at the same time remaining deeply conscious of belonging to Africa and in no way desiring total assimilation by the West.

Isolated individuals at the meeting-point of two cultures, the *évolués* were possessed increasingly of a sense of their own

personality, in contrast to the tribal psychology, in which the group is completely dominant. Influenced by African intellectuals in France, notably the *Présence Africaine* group in Paris, they began to react against the assumption of most Europeans that Africans are in the process of development from an inferior to a superior stage, and to think instead in terms of the contact between two civilizations. While acknowledging European technical superiority, they became conscious that on another level, in the sphere of human relations and the art of living, they possessed much from which Europeans might well learn to profit. They began to resent being treated as less than fully responsible and to demand recognition of their equality, as persons, with Europeans. They were intensely irritated by any tendency to treat Africans as showpieces; a reaction which was sharply manifested in relation to the Congolese village and the school for African children which formed part of the 1958 Brussels Exhibition. 'Why should our people and our children be exposed to view as if they were animals in a zoo?' they asked. They grew to dislike discussions about 'the African', which seemed to assume that he was a strange being completely different from the European.

'One of the westerner's prejudices when he disembarks on African soil is his belief that there is some kind of fundamental difference between white and black. This is because you talk too much about "the African"; the African is like this, the African is like that, the African mentality, African psychology, African philosophy, African intelligence . . . Some colonials follow special courses in order to learn to know the African. Goodness knows what they are told in these lectures. But in any case the African seems to be envisaged by them as if he were some kind of strange animal.'¹

¹ The Abbé Malula of Leopoldville, speaking at the Brussels Exhibition, July 1958.

Demands for Higher Education

It was in the educational field that the *évolués* felt most strongly their inferiority and their need to progress if they were to make good their claim to essential equality with the whites. Before the War the Belgians had concentrated on primary education in the Congo, basing their policy on the belief that if an effectual and widespread system of primary education were established before Africans were allowed to embark on higher education there would be less danger of creating an African *élite* separate from the rest of the population, as was happening in other neighbouring colonies. It was clear, too, that if Congolese went to Europe to study they would inevitably return with new ideas about the political situation in the Colony, and the Belgians certainly did not wish to do anything to encourage political agitation in the Congo. Thus after the War it was only with great caution that Africans began to be admitted to higher education and with even greater caution that a few were allowed to depart for Europe. This policy, like the remaining legislative discrimination between Africans and Europeans, the social colour bar, and the exclusion of Africans from higher administrative posts, caused bitterness and a certain hopelessness on the part of the *évolués*, who saw European education as the chief means by which they might progress towards equality with the whites.

'Equal Pay for Equal Work'

Alongside the desire for higher education went the hope that the qualifications acquired by it would be rewarded with salaries comparable to those of Europeans. The great difference between the standard of living of white and black in the Congo was a primary cause of the *évolués'* resentment. African *assistants médicaux* with years of training behind them and entrusted with considerable responsibilities began to compare their salaries (about 37,500 francs annually) with the much higher amounts (about 137,000 francs) received

by the white *agents sanitaires* who had done a mere six months of preparatory training at Antwerp. Africans were not interested when they were told that the standard of living of workers in the Congo was higher than that of workers in India, that there was far more social welfare in the Congo than there was in Turkey, or that an African worker whose output was 70 per cent. of that of a comparable worker in Belgium might well be receiving an equally high salary in proportion. What they could see with their own eyes was the contrast between the housing, the schools, the street-lighting, and the state of the roads of the European city and of the *cit  indig ne*, respectively; they could not help comparing the European's Cadillac with the African's bicycle, the luxury of the European way of life with the African's lack of bare necessities.

The contrast was even sharper than in other parts of Africa, since the European standard of living in the Congo was exceptionally high; it had been necessary to attract Belgians, who were not travellers by nature and who preferred to stay comfortably at home, by the prospect of material conditions far superior to those which they could expect in Belgium. Faced with this double standard, the * volu s* reacted with the demand for 'equal pay for equal work'. They pressed eagerly for the *statut unique* (equal salaries and conditions for all employees of the administration, black or white), which had been discussed intermittently since 1948 but could no longer be shelved when, in 1958, the first Congolese students were due to graduate from Lovanium.

Political Awakening

The * volu s*' discontent with their social and economic status was accompanied by a growing political consciousness, although the latter was embryonic compared with that emerging elsewhere in Africa during the post-war years. Isolation from outside influences, the difficulty of communications within the Congo itself, and the degree of

material progress attained there combined to encourage restraint in demands for political progress. The first of these did not come until July 1956. Taking up an idea already aired by a Belgian lecturer,¹ the first Congolese manifesto, which appeared in a journal called *Conscience Africaine*, asked for a thirty-year timetable for political, social, and economic emancipation in the Congo. The final goal, declared this manifesto, should be a Congolese nation composed of Africans and Europeans, and its authors strongly criticized the view that there was no important difference between Belgian domination of the Congo and the mere presence of Belgians there.

The second manifesto appeared a short while later; it was far more angry and impatient in tone, and took the form of a reply to the *Conscience Africaine* proposition by the Abako. This society was originally a cultural association of the Bakongo, founded to promote the study and appreciation of their language and history. Now it began to take on a political tone, and to look back nostalgically to the days when the Kingdom of Congo, with its capital at San Salvador, extended a unified rule over all the Bakongo, at present living divided between Portuguese, Belgian, and French territory. The Abako urged the necessity for the emergence of several political parties in the Congo, whereas *Conscience Africaine* had considered that one strong national party would suffice for the moment. The excitement aroused by these two manifestos seemed to die a natural death; it did not in fact result in the creation of political parties at that period. Under the surface, however, the evolution of ideas proceeded rapidly. Whereas in 1956 the *évolués* were asking for planned emancipation by gradual stages, in 1959 they were demanding independence for 1961.

¹ A. A. J. van Bilsen, 'Un plan de trente ans pour l'émancipation politique de l'Afrique Belge', in *Les dossiers de l'Action sociale catholique*, Brussels, February 1956.

III. THE BELGIAN ANSWER

(a) GOVERNMENT ACTION

Official Attitudes and Pronouncements

WE have seen, then, that at the end of the War the Congo was necessarily becoming less insulated against outside influences, and that the *évolués* were beginning to resent the paternalistic attitude of the Europeans, the racial discrimination which was written into the Colony's legislation, and the social colour bar. The policy of the Government in the post-war years attempted to take account of this African feeling, but all it managed to achieve was a series of piecemeal concessions to the demands of the *évolués*; no concerted plan was worked out. Following the usual pattern of colonial history, Belgium endeavoured to find answers to problems which already existed, rather than to foresee those which were likely to arise and to take steps to forestall them.

So far as official attitudes and pronouncements were concerned, the Government continually spoke out against racial discrimination during the post-war years. Its legislative policy aimed at the gradual integration of black and white, but, as Governor-General Jungers declared when he opened the *Conseil de Gouvernement* in 1949, it was not enough that racial discrimination should be banished from the legal texts; it was also necessary 'that men's minds should be exempt from its influence'. He went on to say: 'It is not possible to conceive of a country in which there is no social hierarchy. But when the present evolution reaches its full development, this hierarchy must be based solely on differences of competence, of efficiency and of education.'

But notwithstanding well-intentioned declarations and a certain lessening of racial discrimination during the follow-

ing years, it was the visit of King Baudouin to the Congo six years later that really brought the question of race relations to the fore and aroused great hopes and intense enthusiasm among the African population. Some Europeans were shocked to see the King mixing informally and with evident pleasure with his subjects, freely shaking hands with them, or fetching a chair so that an African woman who found it impossible to follow the conversation might be seated while he talked to her husband in French. As the Africans asked: 'What other white would have done that?' For the Congolese, the King was in their country not as the representative of Belgium, but as their own great chief, someone who was interested in their social welfare and in the difficulties of their daily lives. For example, he showed his concern about their living conditions in a practical way by creating a special fund to make loans to Africans who wished to construct and own their houses in the *centres extra-coutumiers*. The King appeared to the Congolese in the form of a liberator who would put the Europeans in their place, sweep away the social barriers dividing white and black, and usher in a happier state of affairs. It was thus a bitter disappointment to many to find that all did not immediately change after his visit.

On his return from Africa, besides underlining the importance for the future of the Congo of an improvement in race relations, the King took up the already existing concept of a Belgo-Congolese community:

'I want to insist on the fact that the basic problem which now confronts the Congo is that of human relationships between black and white. It is not enough to equip the country materially, to endow it with wise social legislation, and to improve the standard of living of its inhabitants; it is imperative that the whites and the natives should show the widest mutual understanding in their daily contacts. The time will then come—the date cannot yet be determined—to give our African territories a status which will guarantee,

for the happiness of all, the continuing existence of a true Belgo-Congolese community, and which will assure to each, white or black, his proper share in the country's government, according to his own qualities and capacity. Before we realise this high ideal, Gentlemen, much remains to be done.'¹

When he opened the *Conseil de Gouvernement* a few weeks later, Governor-General Petillon took up the King's words, declaring that Belgian policy for the Congo would be neither segregation, nor—except for the few—assimilation, but association. The meaning of this latter term was not completely clear—the Africans were inclined to ask whether it meant the association of a white rider sitting on a black horse. Nor was the 'Belgo-Congolese community' clearly defined. This phrase was used with respect for a while, since it had the royal stamp upon it. Later—although still used in official statements—it came to be treated with a certain cynicism, both in Belgium and in the Congo, as having no precise content.

However, the Government certainly showed some awareness of African thinking in its terminology. Several times Governor-General Petillon referred to the old paternalistic attitude as out of date; in July 1956, for example, he said that the time was approaching when the Congolese would be saying 'Brother' instead of 'Father' to the whites. By 1957, the word 'emancipation' had crept into official terminology. The Colonial Minister Buisseret declared that Belgian policy was simply 'to humanize, to develop, to associate, and finally to emancipate in the framework of that association'.² By 1958 another stage had been reached. When the *Parti Social Chrétien* took office and M. Petillon became Colonial Minister, he immediately opted for 'decolonization'. Over-

¹ From King Baudouin's speech to the Royal African Circle, Brussels, 1 July 1955.

² From M. Buisseret's speech to the *Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales*, 23 October 1957.

night the *Ministère des Colonies* became the *Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*. Yet only eight years before this it had been possible to declare that 'never, up till now, has the word "colony" taken on a pejorative sense in Belgium, and we shall probably be the last to replace it in our official terminology'.¹

Not content with fine words about race relations and the Belgo-Congolese community, the Government wrote the official attitude into the legislation in December 1957, by a 'Decree intended to ensure the repression of acts of a kind to provoke or encourage racial hatred in the Belgian Congo'. Anyone who 'showed racial or ethnic aversion or hatred' was to be liable to punishment by fine or imprisonment or both. This was envisaged at first as directed primarily against the racial attitudes of certain Europeans in the Congo, but of course it also applied to similar attitudes on the part of the Africans, and it was by virtue of this Act that a number of Congolese were arrested after the riots of January 1959 at Leopoldville.

Towards Social Integration

Together with this official attack on manifestations of racial hatred went a serious attempt to begin to integrate the *évolués* into European society. In 1948 the *carte de mérite civique*—a certificate which attested good behaviour but which brought its bearer no very precise benefits—provided for a partial assimilation. The system of *immatriculation*, however, was to give complete juridical assimilation. *Immatriculation* had first been introduced as long ago as 1892—when it was decreed that an African who registered himself as 'civilized' was to enjoy the same civil status as a European—but this measure had remained a dead letter; the legislative distinction continued to be between native and non-native, not between *immatriculé* and *non-immatriculé*. It was the racial character of this distinction which had to be changed after

¹ G. Malengreau, 'La politique coloniale de la Belgique', in *Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration*, London, 1950, p. 41.

the War. In 1949 a commission was set up to study the question of the status of 'civilized' Africans, in 1951 Governor-General Jungers announced the Government's policy of juridical assimilation, and in 1952 the decree on *immatriculation* came into force, giving those Africans who had attained 'civilization in its Western form' juridical assimilation with Europeans. The commission considered whether the *immatriculés* ought to be assimilated not only juridically but also socially and economically. But this suggestion was considered too advanced and was dropped, to the intense disappointment of the Africans, who had hoped that *immatriculation* would mean their admission into European society and the removal of all economic and social barriers. Juridical assimilation was in fact the least interesting of any form of equality from the African point of view.' What an African really cared about was not being judged in the same courts as a European, but that his standard of living should come nearer to that of the whites, that his children should have the same educational advantages as European children, and that he should be accepted as a person worthy of respect by the Europeans with whom he came into contact. *Immatriculation* touched none of these points, and by-passed, so the Africans felt, all that really mattered to them.

Immatriculation was not well received, either by Europeans or Africans. European attitudes showed, according to the Congolese, how little the whites desired to extend their privileged position to include even a small group of Africans. The fact that the project had been elaborated at Brussels was enough to condemn it in the eyes of many Europeans in the Congo, impatient of metropolitan initiatives,¹ and they made no secret of the fact that they thought it premature, and the policy of assimilation a dangerous one. On the African side, criticisms came not only from those *évolués* who felt that *immatriculation* did not go far enough in satisfying their demands but also from those who felt that it threatened

¹ A. Sohier, 'La politique d'intégration', *Zaire*, II, November 1951, p. 903.

African solidarity, artificially splitting the African community and making the *immatriculés* a caste apart from their fellows. Thus many who could have qualified—including the majority of Congolese priests—refused to apply for *immatriculation*.

Legislative Racial Discrimination Removed

Besides the attempt to assimilate a certain number of Africans to the status of the Europeans in the Congo, an effort was made to alleviate the growing discontent of the *évolués* by the gradual suppression of the distinction between black and white in the Colony's legislation. Certain rights, which had formerly belonged exclusively to Europeans, were extended to Africans. For example, in 1953 all Africans, whether *immatriculés* or not, were empowered to become land-owners, both in the *centres extra-coutumiers* (they were thus protected from eviction) and in the rural areas, where they could therefore theoretically become *colons* in the same way as Europeans. In 1955 Africans were authorized to buy and consume all alcoholic drinks (previously they had been limited to beer) and were admitted to cafés run by whites which had previously been reserved for Europeans. Thus there is, legally, no colour discrimination in the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks. There are still cases where Africans who present themselves are told 'we don't serve blacks here', but when a complaint is made to the authorities the proprietor is promptly fined. Legal rights, however, are not sufficient to banish an uncomfortable feeling of not being wanted, and in practice the economic barrier is such that many cafés and restaurants are effectively reserved to European use. In 1958 some of the restrictions on the freedom of movement of Africans in the Congo were abolished. An effort was made towards the unification of the penal legislation; it was decreed that white and black, *immatriculés* or not, were to be judged by all types of courts, whereas previously the *tribunal de police* had been competent to judge Africans but not Europeans. So far as industrial legislation

was concerned, there had been an effort over a period of several years to bring the *contrat d'emploi* (which applied to Europeans) and the *contrat de travail* (which applied to Africans) nearer to each other; by 1958 the main differences left were those concerning holidays and the giving of notice. During the same period a spate of legislation concerned with working conditions was either applied indiscriminately to Europeans and Africans, or extended to Africans benefits which had previously been given to Europeans. Thus in 1951 family allowances were granted to Congolese workers, and in 1956 an old-age pension and health-insurance scheme was introduced for Africans. The Government was clearly working gradually towards racial equality before the law, in contrast to the discrimination which had formerly marked the whole of the Colony's legislation.

Consultative Councils

In the same spirit there was in the early post-war years a certain Africanization of the Congo's consultative councils—the *Conseil de Gouvernement*, the *Conseils de Province*, and the *Députation Permanente*. Before 1947 native interests on these councils had always been represented by Europeans; in 1947 two Africans replaced two of these Europeans on the *Conseil de Gouvernement*, and from 1951 native interests were represented entirely by eight Africans appointed by the Government. In 1957 a more thorough-going reform did away with the representation of the natives as such, and instead created new categories of councillors—who could be European or African—to represent the societies, the independent middle classes, the workers, the rural areas, and so on. In practice, this meant that more Africans sat on the councils than before. These councils were at first simply consultative. Slowly they were given more powers; from 1957, for example, the *Conseil de Gouvernement* could make propositions for the Colony's budget, instead of merely examining the proposals of Brussels. But nevertheless such changes did not go very far towards appeasing the desire for a deliberative assembly.

Communal Elections

According to the Belgian plan, preparation for the responsibilities of legislative government was also to begin on the communal level; in their communes the Africans were to gain experience of democratic procedure which would later serve them on the national plane. A beginning was made in 1957 with the decree on the *statut de villes*. Certain towns were divided into communes (African or European), each of which then elected its own communal council on a three-year mandate; the *bourgmestre* was chosen by the communal council, but nominated by the Provincial Governor, who could thus veto any candidate whom he considered to be unsuitable. All males of twenty-five years or over, either Belgians or Africans born in the Congo, were entitled to vote. Late in 1957 the first elections were held in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville; in 1958 Bukavu, Lulua-bourg, Stanleyville, and two satellite towns of Leopoldville came under the *statut des villes*, and at the end of the year another series of communal elections was held.

On the whole, voting in the African communes followed tribal divisions; a man tended to vote for a candidate who belonged to his own tribe rather than for one of whose programme he approved. Often enough a candidate did not put forward a programme at all, although sometimes he might—in Elisabethville for example—label himself as a Liberal or a Socialist. Again, there were the few who put forward a programme of local improvements. One candidate at Stanleyville proposed a three-point programme to the electorate at the end of 1958. There was to be discipline on the roads, with a strict enforcement of the speed limit and the provision of street-lighting (there had been five after-dark murders in the commune during the preceding six months); there was to be discipline in the sphere of recreation, with an attempt to empty the bars of the large numbers of men who congregated there even when they were not actually drinking, together with the provision of a

football field; and there was to be more discipline in general—one of the points under this head being that the gardens around the houses were to be cared for instead of being left to run wild. But the majority of candidates did not present themselves as having any particular attachment to the Belgian political parties, nor any special plans for local improvements, but simply as having sufficient education and ability to represent the electorate before the Europeans. 'I am a man who can defend your interests before the whites,' a candidate might say, supporting his words with a liberal distribution of beer. But in the last resort the votes were generally cast along tribal lines. If a man surveyed the list of candidates in his commune and found that nobody from his own tribe appeared on it he might quite well declare that 'there's no one I can vote for here'. This tendency was often combated by the younger men who had come under the influence of the students of the Congolese or Belgian universities. Unlike their elders, they had reached the conclusion that in the modern world the encouragement of small groups, tribal or otherwise, was a retrograde step, and that economically or politically it would be better that the Congo should preserve the unity it had gained under Belgian colonial rule.

Trade Unions

In industrial relations, as in politics, the Belgians realized that it was necessary to prepare the Africans for the future exercise of democratic responsibilities. A beginning had been made immediately after the War in 1946, with the creation of consultative councils of African workers intended to facilitate contact both between the employers and their African personnel and between the administration and the workers. But as in the field of government, admission to these consultative councils only aroused the desire for a more decisive voice in affairs which touched the interests of the participants so directly, and a natural result was the emergence of a demand for African trade unions. The Euro-

peans in the Congo had taken advantage of their isolation from Brussels during the War to form unions; before 1939 this had not been possible, since the companies had simply sent home any of their employees who had shown signs of giving trouble. In 1942 it became legal for Europeans to form unions, and, in 1944 (after several illegal strikes had occurred), to strike. Two years later Africans were permitted to group themselves in professional associations; strikes, however, remained illegal. They finally gained the right to strike in January 1957, at the time of the revision of the whole of the legislation concerning the right of association in the Congo. Racial discrimination in this field was thus removed; it was the *inhabitants* of the Congo who were given the right to associate in order to defend their professional interests, and also (with the exception of the agents of the administration) the right to strike. This right of association was only given, however, subject to government approval of each particular association; each had to be registered by the administration, and if registration was refused there was no appeal.

African Salaries

In the post-war years it was the question of salaries which appeared to the Congolese as the acid test of European intentions; fine words in official speeches about the Belgo-Congolese community meant little while there remained so great a difference between the rates of pay of Europeans and those of Africans doing precisely the same jobs in the service of the administration. Before the War there had been no problem, for the functions of Europeans and Africans had been quite distinct; when this was no longer so the problem of the discrepancies in salary was posed acutely, and was inevitably felt by the Congolese to be a sign of racial discrimination. The demand for equal pay for equal work became more and more general among the Africans. The *évolués*, who had previously been content to compare their earnings with those of their less-qualified fellows, now tended

instead to compare them with the salaries of Europeans. And while they might not take account of the fact that an employer might sometimes be able to get the same work done by one European girl typist as by two African clerks, they were very quick to notice the difference between the two rates of pay.

In this field, as in others, the Government failed to foresee the problem and take the necessary measures in advance; it was overtaken by circumstances and by African pressure. Not until 1958, when the first students were due to graduate from Lovanium, did the Government really come to grips with a problem which had been discussed intermittently during the preceding ten years. Now, however, it was obliged to take account of the opinion of these students, who would soon be comparing their salaries with those of white graduates, an opinion, moreover, which they did not hesitate to express publicly. In February 1958 the students of Lovanium prepared a memorandum on the subject. Since, however, the Government seemed to take no notice of their proposals, they sent an open letter to the Colonial Minister in April, to remind him of the interview which they had recently had with him. They had, they recalled, informed him then that they were, and would remain, opposed to all forms of colonialism. The Minister had promised, they said, that all discrimination between black and white in the Congo was to cease. Why, then, they asked, should a difference be made between the salaries paid to those agents of the administration who were engaged in Belgium and those of agents engaged in the Congo? Why should the former receive half as much again on the grounds of their specialization, when in fact their qualifications were identical with those of their African colleagues, and why should they in addition receive larger family allowances? The difference was the more questionable in view of the fact that the definition of those engaged in Belgium had been so arranged that 'in practice the metropolitan is no longer a Belgian whose habitual residence is in Belgium, engaged for a limited term

of service in the Congo, but anyone whose parents are Belgians'. The students were sarcastic about those who were Congolese when it came to exploiting the land and its wealth, and metropolitans when it came to wanting a large salary. If Europeans and Africans were not given the same treatment, they wrote, they were ready to turn the Congo into a second Algeria. This latter threat, however, they consented to withdraw a week later.

After these representations from the students and further pressure from the trade unions it was finally decided that in January 1959 a *statut unique* should come into force for all the agents of the administration; that is to say that for equal qualifications and capacity all were to receive equal remuneration and equal opportunities for advancement. There was to be no difference between the salaries of those engaged in the Congo, whether African or European, and those of Europeans engaged in Belgium. Private enterprise, it was clear, would sooner or later be obliged to follow the example of the Government.

Inter-racial Education

Equal pay for equal qualifications was, of course, valueless unless Africans had the opportunity to gain qualifications which were in fact equal to those of Europeans. In the post-war years one of the most insistent African demands was that for higher education, and in general for educational opportunities equal to those of the whites. In the years before the War almost all education in the Congo had been provided by the mission schools—by the national missions (mainly Catholic) with the aid of government subsidies, and by the foreign missions (mainly Protestant) without such help. Education had been primarily education for the masses, and there was no higher education for Africans except in the seminaries. There were two entirely separate educational systems, one for the small minority of European children, and the other for the African majority. After the War the Catholic monopoly was broken when, in 1946, a

Liberal Minister accorded subsidies to Protestant mission schools, and also set up non-confessional State schools within the educational system intended for European children. In 1948 the strict racial discrimination in education began to break down, when schools formerly reserved for European children were opened to Asiatic children and to those children of mixed race whose fathers accepted legal responsibility for them. Two years later, the same privilege was extended to Congolese children and to those children of mixed race who were not recognized by their fathers. On both occasions some of the European parents objected, but the scheme went ahead in spite of their protests; thus after 1950 there was no longer any legal barrier to inter-racial education in the Congo.

There still remained a distinction between the races, for African children who applied for admission to European schools were obliged to appear before special commissions which examined not only their educational qualifications but also the general standard of living of their families, and matters such as their personal hygiene and freedom from infection. After a few years the *évolués* began to dislike this test, on the grounds that it represented a form of racial discrimination and was open to serious abuse. It was not surprising that a parent objected if the commission deemed his child to be unsuitable for a European school on grounds of health, while at the same time he was told that the child's condition was not serious enough to warrant medical attention. This happened in a large number of cases in Elisabethville in the autumn of 1958.

University Education

Although Africans were now admitted to European primary and secondary schools and a number of new schools were started which were specifically inter-racial (such as the college opened at Usumbura in 1951 and the *athénées* set up in 1955), this did not satisfy the Congolese. There was an increasing demand for university education. It was govern-

ment policy, however, to discourage students from going to Europe. From 1953 onwards only a very few Congolese, sent by private initiative or, later, by the *Conseils Supérieurs* of Ruanda or Urundi, had received permission to study in Belgium. Individual Belgians pressed for the number to be increased and for a special fund to be set up for this purpose, but this was consistently opposed by the Government. Therefore, in response to African pressure, universities had to be provided at home.

In 1956, the year in which the first Congolese student graduated at Louvain, the Congo's first university—the Catholic University of Lovanium, daughter of Louvain—was opened at Leopoldville. Two years later a non-confessional State university was set up at Elisabethville. Both were inter-racial, Lovanium with roughly two-thirds of its students (365 in all in 1958–59) African and a third European, and Elisabethville (with 219 students in 1958–59) having almost the reverse proportion of white to black, about a quarter of the students being African.

Education for Women

The education of Congolese women has lagged far behind that of the men. In the early years the administration was chiefly concerned with primary education for boys with a view to forming auxiliaries for the administration, while African parents did not realize the value of education for their daughters. Later the *évolués* themselves were not unanimous in their attitudes to girls' education; some wanted companions who could share their interests and accept an equal responsibility in bringing up their children, but others still preferred wives who had not been to school, on the grounds that they would be more docile and obedient and would work harder. Gradually, however, the former view prevailed. The *évolués* who wished to receive Europeans in their homes were embarrassed when their wives could not speak enough French to greet their visitors, let alone to join in a conversation. Some began to teach their wives French

themselves, but this was rare; most blamed the Europeans for not having done so earlier. A certain number of boarding schools for the daughters of *évolués* were opened in which the teaching was in French right from the lowest classes.

The social services developed after the War also provided increasing education for women. The *foyers sociaux* were designed to give African women practical instruction in running a home and, by training some of the more advanced as monitors entrusted with the task of teaching and helping the others, to develop a sense of social responsibility. These *foyers* are crowded, noisy, happy places. But there is, of course, the danger that the social workers, who are among the minority of European women who learn the local languages, and whose professional work is concerned with the African women, may become an artificial buffer between black and white, rather than a connecting link. So long as African women did not speak French, there could be very little contact between them and the majority of European women in the Congo, who usually spoke only enough of the local language to be able to direct the household tasks. An effort has therefore been made to interest European women in voluntary work in connexion with the *foyers sociaux*, and to arrange special courses for the wives of State agents and company employees before they leave Belgium to prepare them for life in the Congo, and especially to help them to realize the importance of their relations with African women. Sometimes groups of Europeans meet with Africans to give practical hints on the running of a household or the arrangement of a home. In more informal groups of this kind it may be possible to get beyond the relationship of teacher and taught, which is inevitable in the *foyers sociaux*. The Catholic 'family movement' has begun to extend the idea of contact between Europeans and Africans to the plane of the whole family.

(b) NON-GOVERNMENT MOVES

Catholic Missions

In many ways the missions had gone ahead of the Government towards integration. The first African had been ordained priest in the Congo as early as 1917, and by 1959 there were more than six hundred Congolese priests. Two African bishops had been consecrated—one at the head of a Vicariate in Ruanda in 1952, and an auxiliary Bishop in the lower Congo in 1956—long before there was anything comparable in the sphere of civil government. The Bishops' declaration of June 1956 made it clear that the Church approved in principle of political emancipation:

'All the inhabitants of a country have the duty to collaborate actively for the common good. They have therefore the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

'The trustee nation is obliged to respect this right, and to favour its exercise by progressive political education.

'The native peoples must be aware of the complexity of their responsibilities, and must fit themselves to assume them. It is not for the Church to pronounce on the precise form in which a people's emancipation may come. She considers this legitimate so long as it is accomplished in charity and the respect of mutual rights.'

The election in Belgium of a Liberal-Socialist coalition Government in 1954 led to a clash between the Government and the Catholic missions over educational policy in the Congo; about the same time Rome was showing an increasing desire to dissociate evangelization from the colonial system and to ensure that the Church in Africa should as far as possible be thoroughly 'African'. The two factors in combination encouraged the Catholic missions to break away from the close link with the State which they had traditionally conserved in the Belgian Congo. This breaking of the old-established alliance was regarded as something of

a stab in the back by a section of the colonial administration; the Church was accused of wanting to go too fast, of siding with the African extremists, of working with the State so long as it suited her interests and then withdrawing her collaboration when things became difficult.

There were quite as many critics on the opposite side, however; in the eyes of many Africans the Church was inextricably linked with the colonial authorities, it was European in form and expression, and the domination of the missionaries was felt to be just as irksome as that of any other class of whites. Some said that the missions had only been interested in the education of priests, and not in the higher education of the laity; that they had encouraged low salaries for Africans on the grounds that their needs were few and higher salaries would only be spent on concubines; and that in general the Church tended to hinder African progress. Some of the *évolués* were inclined to think of the Church as something which belonged to their childhood in the villages, but which had lost its relevance when they moved to the towns. Often they became embittered by the way in which the Church appeared to practise racial discrimination; many churches were in fact, if not in theory, 'white' or 'black' as a result of their geographical location, and in other areas the Europeans would install themselves comfortably in the choir as a matter of course, while the Africans were expected to take their places in the nave. And while the *évolués* were irritated by this racial discrimination, and by their impression that the Church did not encourage any but the priests to progress towards assimilation into European society, the mass of Africans tended to regard Christianity as a foreign importation, something which was, after all, a European affair. This was one reason for the success of separatist movements, such as Kibangism, Kitawala, the Ba-apostolic group, and others, which offered the Africans a black mediator or interpreted the history of salvation in expressly African terms. Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ of the Europeans; could He really be the Christ of

the Africans too? At Midnight Mass a congregation interrupted the sermon of a Congolese priest with cries of 'It isn't true' when he declared that Christ had become incarnate to save Africans, and when he added 'and the Europeans', with cries of 'Bravo for the whites'. Children greeted the sight of a black doll destined for a nativity play with a scornful 'He wasn't black'.

There was the feeling, too, that African priests were treated as inferiors by the missionaries, that they were placed in the hardest and least-rewarding posts, and that when they lived and worked in teams with Europeans they were kept in subordinate positions. A priest straight out from Europe lost his breviary one day and discovered that a newly-ordained African had borrowed it to compare it page by page with his own; he had feared that as an African he might have been given a second-rate breviary which was not quite up to European standards. It was in fact not always true that African priests were placed in subordinate posts; in Ruanda there was an African Bishop in charge of a diocese, and in Leopoldville the African Rector of a large parish had two European missionaries serving as curates under him. But the *évolués* were inclined to ask why there were only two African bishops, why there were not many more African priests, and why there were no African professors in the seminaries.

Protestant Missions

The Protestant missions, too, had gone ahead with the training of African pastors; well over five hundred men had been ordained by 1958, and twice that number were fulfilling the function of pastor although they were not ordained. There was often the same feeling about their being placed in subordinate positions and not being entrusted with very much responsibility as there was in the case of the African priests. Without a non-missionary European population, however, the Protestants suffered less than the Catholics from racial divisions in their churches, and since they were

not in the main of Belgian nationality, they were less identified in the eyes of the Congolese with the colonial administration.

The majority of the Protestant missions at work in the Congo thought of the Church in terms of the local 'gathered community'. They aimed at gradually transferring authority from the European missionaries to the African leaders of the local churches. But it was impossible to hand over authority in this way, however, until the Government had accorded the right of association to Africans, for an African church, independent of the European mission organization, could not legally exist. The missions had banded together to form the Congo Protestant Council; in 1956 Africans were admitted to this body as full voting members—a privilege previously reserved for European missionaries only. There was some opposition to this method of securing a colony-wide fellowship of African Protestants, however; since the Congo Protestant Council was a missionary organization, designed to form a link between the missions as such, some Protestants believed that rather than try to integrate Africans into it, a quite separate council should be formed, composed of representatives of the African churches. But whatever the disagreement over methods, there was no doubt about the principle. As the Secretary of the Protestant Bureau in Brussels wrote early in 1959:

'To me it has been clear for many years that the Congo missions and missionaries must get away from the paternal ways in which we have led most of our activities in the Congo. We have often worked under the misconception that the Africans are grown-ups with a child's mind. Nothing is more false. They are adults, think as adults, and want responsibility as adults.'

The Protestant missionaries, like the Catholics, were becoming convinced that the paternalism of the past was finished; they were coming to see that the young Congo

churches must be given responsibility for their own future, aided, but not directed, by the European missionaries.

Attempts at Social Integration

Thus both the Government and non-government groups were moving at various speeds from the old paternalism in the direction of racial integration. In many ways the missions had preceded the administration. The big companies had lagged behind, but they, too, were following the general pattern by 1959. In the mining camps of the Katanga, recreational centres run by elected African committees had appeared, and more Africans were moving out of the camps into the *centres extra-coutumiers*, where they could buy their own houses. So far as the European settlers were concerned, having tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Government to favour a radical increase in white settlement in the Congo during the preceding years, they made at least one serious attempt to put integration into practice when in 1953 they invited the African 'middle class' to join the various settlers' unions; the *Fédération des Colons* became the *Fédération des Colons et des Classes Moyennes du Congo*. This attempt was not, however, particularly successful, since after a hopeful beginning the settlers were not in fact able to persuade the African middle class (clerks, small contractors, shopkeepers, and the like) that the two groups had enough joint interests to make a common front worth-while.

There had been quite a number of other private moves towards closer contact between black and white—the Belgo-Congolese groups in some of the towns, the Catholic 'family movement', and the Socialist *amicales*. Some of these, however, tended to foster somewhat artificial contacts with no relevance to the ordinary relationships between black and white in daily life, and Africans became embittered by the fact that Europeans who would warmly shake hands with them in the context of a Belgo-Congolese group would pass them by in the street without a sign of recognition. However, the first African family moved into the European city at

Leopoldville in the summer of 1958; at first there was some opposition on the part of the neighbours, but they were soon on friendly terms with the new inhabitants.

Social integration was seen to be not merely a question of legislation but, above all, one of attitudes. And for the Africans it was becoming essential to know whether or not social integration was a practical possibility. Even children of seven or eight would put a host of questions on this theme to a stranger. 'Do you have black priests in your country—black bishops? Do you have white bricklayers—white farm labourers? Do you have asphalted roads everywhere? Do you have settlers in your country? Do the whites and the blacks live together there?' Every aspect of life in the Congo tended to be seen in racial terms. The normal relationship of teacher to taught, and the necessary discipline that this involves for the latter, was often resented, as if it constituted a form of racial discrimination, since inevitably the teacher was European and the pupils African. Some Africans felt that they were reprimanded or failed their examinations not because they had not worked hard enough, but because they were black. But, above all, Africans wanted a relationship with Europeans which was more than just limited to the sphere of their work; they desired a personal relationship. On one occasion a departmental head did not tell his African colleagues that his father had died; they learned the news from some other source, and commented sorrowfully, 'You see, he only regards us as workers, not as people.' Legal differences between black and white might be disappearing, but many tensions still remained in the field of personal relationships.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO, 1954-58

The Breakdown of Belgian Solidarity in the Congo

THE general discontent of the *évolués* in the post-war years, the integration policy of the Government and of private bodies, and the rapidity with which events were moving in other parts of Africa all threatened the stability of the colonial régime in the Congo. But this was shaken even more, by the change of government in 1954, when the Belgian electorate replaced a Catholic government by a Liberal-Socialist coalition. The importance of this event for the Congo lay not so much in a sudden change of colonial policy, for the broad lines of M. Buisseret's policy as Colonial Minister followed that of his predecessors, but rather in the fact that it brought Africans to a realization of the divisions which existed among the Belgians themselves. This election marked the breakdown of the all-powerful alliance of the administration, the Catholic missions, and the companies, a union which had been shaken but not destroyed immediately after the War. The year 1954 saw the dissolution of the old front of white solidarity in the Congo.

In the first place the Government's educational policy aroused the hostility of the missions. In 1946 a Liberal Minister had set up a number of 'lay' schools on the Belgian pattern which were open to European children in the Congo, as against the confessional schools, which had previously been the only ones available for white or black. In view of this it was unreasonable that African parents, whatever their beliefs, should be obliged to send their children to confessional schools. But M. Buisseret's methods in extending the right of choice to African parents were far from happy;

the report of his commission of inquiry¹ ridiculed the whole system of Catholic education in the Congo, and when the Minister announced his intention of setting up lay schools for African children he also proposed crippling cuts in the subsidies granted to Catholic schools. The latter threatened to go on strike if these impossible conditions were imposed, and the Congo Press took up sides for or against the Minister. The big companies were unfavourable to the new policy, fearing that the disruption of the old alliance between State, Church, and capitalism would shake the stability of the colonial régime in the Congo, and the Governor-General uttered a warning against the introduction of Belgian party politics into the life of the colony. 'In the Congo we should not start to scorn and hate each other. We ought not to allow the inhabitants of the country—I am thinking especially of the natives—to be led into false conflicts, nor enlisted in factions . . .'²

The significance of this controversy lay precisely in the fact that the Africans were 'enlisted in factions'. In defending his policy against the attacks of the missions the Colonial Minister declared that it was supported by African opinion, and by an 'irresistible pressure' on the part of the *évolués*; he told the *Parlement* that he was setting up lay schools 'in reply to the pressure of hundreds of Africans who speak in the name of various groups, as my documentation can show'.³ Thus the Congolese became aware for the first time both of Belgian divisions and of the profit which they themselves could draw from them; they realized that their wishes could become a deciding factor in European quarrels, and they came to see the political value of organized public opinion. The petition of the *Conseil Supérieur* of Urundi to the Belgian *Parlement* (opposing the opening of a lay school at Usumbura)

¹ *La réforme de l'enseignement: Mission pédagogique Coulon-Deheyne-Renson*, Brussels, 1954.

² Governor-General Petillon to the *Conseil de Gouvernement*, 18 August 1955.

³ During the budget debate, 15 June 1954.

was the first indication of this awareness. Greeted by the Socialists as a 'clerical plot', the petition was by no means welcomed by the Catholic party either, least of all by those former Colonial Ministers within the party who were able to realize its anti-colonial significance.¹

Anti-clericalism

The battle over educational policy had given a fair number of Congolese the opportunity to discover that they were 'anti-clericals'. Once M. Buisseret had shown that the missions were not all-powerful, many Africans were ready to throw off a yoke which they had come to feel as burdensome. The Colonial Minister was regarded by the majority of the *évolués* as a great liberator, and enjoyed immense popularity among them. The few lay schools which had sprung up by the side of the mission schools were magnificently equipped, and the Congolese were given the impression that the missionaries could have provided them with such schools long before, if only they had not wanted to retard African progress. The *évolués* were anti-clerical rather than anti-Christian; above all, they were anti-colonial, and the unpopularity of the missionaries was but one expression of their growing nationalism. By withdrawing their allegiance from the missionaries they could affirm their independence, and the introduction of Belgian political parties gave them the opportunity. There was a great deal of Liberal propaganda in the Congo; the Liberals had found the ground prepared among the white settlers, and soon had groups of supporters among the *évolués* as well. On the whole, the Socialists had still greater success among the Congolese. Both groups preached an anti-paternalism which delighted the Africans. The old protective attitude among Belgian Socialists and agnostics had gone; they considered now that the Africans had passed beyond the stage where they needed religion. The Congolese were to be able to make a free

¹ A. A. J. van Bilsen, 'Quatre années de politique congolaise', *La Revue Nouvelle*, May 1958.

choice; God was not to be imposed upon them. The endowment of the Congo with lay schools was a natural consequence of this change of attitude, as was the introduction of Belgian political patterns.

The Breakdown of Paternalism

The breakdown of traditional paternalism, which had begun after the War, gathered considerable momentum during the four years in which M. Buisseret was Colonial Minister. Before 1954 there had already been warning signs that change must come, but the Congo remained a model colony in the apparent stability of its régime and its slow and untroubled development. By 1958 the old alliance between Church and State had broken down, somewhat to the relief of many of the missionary leaders, and even the union between the State and the trusts had been slightly shaken, for the latter had not appreciated the Government's decision to call in American capital for the development of the hydro-electric resources of the lower Congo by the Inga scheme. These four years had seen the clear emergence of a politically conscious African *élite*; symbolically the manifesto of *Conscience Africaine* had appeared at precisely the same time as the first Congolese student graduated in Belgium, in July 1956. The Africans had come to demand a definite programme for the emancipation of the Congo; they wanted to express their opinion on the Colony's future, and to have responsibility in carrying out the plans which would be made with their consent. This political awakening had been influenced by individual Belgians with progressive ideas; M. van Bilsen's 'thirty years' plan' had been taken up by *Conscience Africaine*, and his *Groupe Marzorati*¹ brought together Belgians and Africans for informal discussions about the future of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in a way which had never occurred before.

M. Buisseret's term of office was the period in which *Con-*

¹ A. A. J. van Bilsen. 'Le groupe Marzorati pour l'étude des problèmes africains', *Synthèses*, Brussels, January 1959.

science Africaine and the Abako had both spoken out, the first African journal had appeared—and been suppressed, the *Conseil Supérieur* of Urundi had petitioned the Belgian *Parlement*, and in Ruanda the Bahutu had produced their manifesto in reaction against the traditional Batutsi monopoly of political, social, and economic influence.¹ There had been a great leap forward towards emancipation in these four years—not so much because this had been planned by the Minister, but because of the effect of the introduction of European divisions into the Congo, where the whites had hitherto presented a common front. The timing, at least, of the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto had been suggested by a number of European lay Catholics in Leopoldville to coincide with the Belgian Socialist party's declaration of policy with regard to the Congo, in order to steal the latter's thunder. It was in part a desire to decrease missionary influence which had led some of the anti-clericals among the Europeans to support the Kibangists, a separatist African sect born in the lower Congo. The result—a sudden quasi-toleration of the sect—led the Africans to think that the Government was afraid of the Kibangists, and no longer dared to suppress their activities. There was a lack of confidence in the Government, for the Africans were well aware of the rift between Colonial Minister Buisseret and Governor-General Petillon. The Africans had learned that their opinions counted for something in the midst of European quarrels, and African leaders able to formulate those opinions were emerging. Whatever the intentions of the Colonial Minister, the result of his term of office was a political awakening in the Congo, and for this the Africans were extremely grateful to him.

¹ The Batutsi, a pastoral people of Hamitic origin, are the feudal overlords in Ruanda; by invasion and conquest they subdued the original Bantu inhabitants, the Bahutu, who live by agriculture.

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO, 1958-59

The Change of Government

As a result of the Belgian elections in the summer of 1958, the *Parti Social Chrétien* took office with Liberal support, and Governor-General Petillon stepped into the shoes of M. Buisseret as Colonial Minister. He announced a policy of 'decolonization', changed the title of the *Ministère des Colonies* into that of the *Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, and in August appointed a parliamentary commission which was to visit the Congo, to consult representatives both of the Europeans and the Africans, and then on the basis of their findings to elaborate the broad lines of a policy of emancipation. Belgians asked themselves whether this was the beginning of the '*dépolitisation*' of the Congo. Those who had considered the general uneasiness in the Colony during the preceding years to be the result of the Colonial Minister's partisan policy rejoiced to see a 'technician' rather than a 'politician' take his place. But M. Petillon's term of office was brief. He was inclined to follow too personal a policy for the tastes of his fellow Ministers, and after a few months he was accused of anti-Flemish prejudices and was replaced by a Flemish Minister, M. van Hemelrijck. Although he had done fine work as Governor-General, M. Petillon had not been particularly popular in recent years among the Africans, for during the period when M. Buisseret had been regarded as a great liberator of the Congo the Governor-General had appeared to want to put the brake on his policy whenever possible. Nevertheless, there was a considerable outcry among the Africans, who asked why the Congo should be affected by a purely internal Belgian question of Flemish-Walloon rivalry. They

were not particularly favourable to the Flemish section of the Belgian community; the attempt to impose Flemish in the Congo had appeared to them absurd, and, thinking in a world perspective, they would have much preferred English as a second language. But it was in fact in Flemish Catholic circles that African aspirations were going to meet with the most sympathy in the following months—possibly because the Flemish had themselves emerged from an under-privileged position and had had to struggle hard to obtain a voice in Belgian affairs.

Congolese Visits to Belgium

Outside influences had strongly affected the Congo throughout the summer of 1958. In the first place, there was an exceptional degree of contact with Belgium itself. Before 1958 there had been a handful of Congolese students in Belgium, and a few short visits for various groups of Congolese had been organized, but there was no precedent for the influx of several hundred Africans from all parts of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi which occurred during the period of the Brussels Exhibition. These Africans were able to see the Belgians at home and to compare them with the Belgians in the Congo—always to the disadvantage of the latter. They were able to leave the C.A.P.A. (*Centre d'accueil du personnel africain*), where food and lodging had been provided for them, for the pleasure of eating in a Brussels restaurant and being served by a white 'boy'. Africans from all over the Colony lived together at the C.A.P.A., and amidst their tribal frictions they were able to become conscious of the value of Congolese unity; they were able to discover that African problems and hopes were much the same in every part of the country. They returned with new ideas, to continue the discussion at home.

Influence from the Rest of Africa

It was not only contact with Belgium which broadened Congolese horizons in 1958; the influence of French policy

was strong throughout the year. The French territories of West and Equatorial Africa were given the choice of either immediate independence or becoming autonomous republics under French leadership. De Gaulle offered independence at Brazzaville, on Leopoldville's very doorstep, and at the end of the year the Congo Republic took its place within the French community. Then in December the Accra conference of independence movements, under the sign of the independence and unity of Africa, was immensely important in increasing Congolese consciousness of belonging to the rest of the continent. The three Congolese who attended as representatives of the *Mouvement National Congolais*—Patrice Lumumba, president of the M.N.C., Gaston Diomi, *bourgmestre* of the Ngiri-Ngiri commune of Leopoldville, and Joseph Ngalula, editor of *Présence Congolaise*—returned to spread the conviction that the independence of colonial territories was a right which could no longer be denied to them, and that a term would soon be put to all foreign domination in Africa. At Accra the Congolese delegates discovered the solidarity of African independence movements, and never again could the Congo be isolated from the rest of the continent. M. Lumumba became a member of the permanent organization which was set up by the Accra conference, and on his return he announced at a large meeting held in Leopoldville that the *Mouvement National Congolais* was in wholehearted support of the view propounded at Accra that no African country ought to be a dependent territory after 1961.

Congolese Political Parties

The M.N.C. had been formed in October 1958; it stood for the political education of the masses and the preparation of an *élite* to run the country, for the democratization of the existing consultative councils in the Congo, for the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the United Nations Charter, for the unity of the country as against all regional separatism, and finally for the independence of the Congo within a

reasonable time. About the same time African political groups began to spring up in various parts of the country—the *Centre de Regroupement Africain* (or Cerea) at Bukavu, the *Union Nationale Congolaise* at Stanleyville, the *Union Progressiste Congolaise* (U.P.E.C.O.) at Leopoldville, and others. The *Union Congolaise* had been founded at Elisabethville in 1957; it grouped both Africans and also progressive Europeans who were prepared to make their future in an independent Congo. The new groups were purely African, vehicles of African public opinion. Instead of attaching themselves to the Belgian political parties, the Congolese had begun to form their own. These new groups, on the whole, took up their stand on two main points—the independence and the unity of the Congo. They saw a blind tribalism as the enemy of progress, to be combated as fiercely as colonialism. M. Lumumba had declared at Accra:

‘This historic conference which brings us together, politicians of all the countries of Africa, shows us that in spite of frontiers and ethnic differences, we are of one mind and have the same desire to make our continent a happy one, free from anxiety, and from the fear of colonial domination. Down with colonialism and tribalism! Long live the Congolese nation! Long live an independent Africa!’

Hitherto the only organized political group had been a tribal one—the Abako—for the various ethnic associations of Leopoldville and the rest of the Congo could hardly be called political groups, while the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto had been an isolated production and had never claimed to be the programme of a political party. The African groups which were formed in 1958 to work for independence were something quite new in the Congo scene. They gained impetus after the Accra conference, and in Leopoldville the M.N.C. began to attract some of the former adherents of the Abako.

Leopoldville, January 1959

But Accra and the growing power of the M.N.C. were only the latest of a series of political developments which excited African opinion and contributed to the troubled state of Leopoldville at the end of 1958. In 1957 there had been the inflammatory articles of the first African-directed journal, the *Congo*, and its suppression by the authorities. Early in 1958 the inaugural speech of the Abako leader Joseph Kasavubu as *bourgmestre* of the Dendale commune had taken a strongly political turn and criticized the whole of Belgian policy in the Congo. In November inflammatory tracts demanding independence—disclaimed by the M.N.C.—had been circulating in the native city. There were rumours that independence was to be granted on 13 January (the date for which a declaration of Government policy had been promised) and places in the future cabinet were already being assigned. According to one scheme, Joseph Kasavubu (*bourgmestre* of the Dendale commune) was to be President of the Congo Republic, Gaston Diomi (*bourgmestre* of the Ngiri-Ngiri commune) Minister of the Interior, and Arthur Pinzi (*bourgmestre* of the Kalumu commune) Minister of Foreign Affairs. The speeches of the M.N.C. delegates who returned from Accra added to the tension. The latent discontent which had earlier found its only possible outlet in the African separatist sects was now seeking a more direct expression in the political field.

However, the causes of tension in Leopoldville were social as well as political. The overpopulation and the poverty of parts of the native city were appalling. The salaries of certain categories of workers were too low to pay for adequate food and lodging for a family; while the average rent was 1,200 francs a month, the minimum legal salary for an African worker in Leopoldville was forty francs a day. In addition, there was a very large number of unemployed—estimates vary between fifteen and forty thousand. Many adolescents, having finished primary school, found them-

selves without either work or the possibility of further education. The influx of Africans to Leopoldville had been insufficiently controlled, and there had been no time to extend the excellent housing schemes carried out in some parts of the city to cover the whole area inhabited by Africans. Faced with this mass of population, paternalism was impotent; in the Katanga, where the problem had not to be faced on so large a scale, it was more adequate. In Elisabethville there is nothing to be seen comparable to the worst parts of the African city at Leopoldville. Certainly the misery in Leopoldville was less than in Brazzaville; it was not this, however, which struck the Africans, but rather the racial discrimination in such things as salaries and housing conditions in Leopoldville itself.

The Disturbances

In this situation very little was needed to set off a violent manifestation of discontent and racial hatred among the African population of Leopoldville, and the banning of the Abako meeting to be held on 4 January in the Y.M.C.A. premises in the Kalumu commune was enough. The Abako supporters who had gathered in the hope of hearing M. Pinzi report on his recent visit to Belgium grew excited and talked wildly of independence; M. Kasavubu, who was also present, failed to calm them. The police arrived and resorted to the use of firearms; anger spread throughout the native city, and the cry of independence was taken up; the pent-up fury of many months was unloosed; Europeans were attacked and churches, schools, hospitals, and social centres destroyed. The Europeans gave way to panic, the Army was called in, and the repression was violent. Casualties among the Europeans might have been much heavier had not some of them been hidden and protected from the crowds by individual Africans. They might have been lighter, however, had not Radio Leopoldville played down the gravity of the situation, and reported that all was calm in regions where rioting was

in fact in full progress. As a result, unsuspecting Europeans became involved in the riots when they could have avoided the affected neighbourhoods. Casualty figures are difficult to establish; the official figures given at the end of March by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry were forty-nine African deaths and forty-nine Europeans and three hundred and thirty Africans wounded. M. Kasavubu was arrested; a few days later the Abako was dissolved and MM. Pinzi and Diomi arrested. This seemed strange to the Africans, since the first reaction of the authorities had been to praise the *bourgmestres* for their efforts to keep order in their communes. Both the Abako and the separatist sect of the Kibangists were hotly denounced in the Belgian Press. No evidence was ever offered, however, that either the leaders of the Abako or those of the Kibangists had instigated or encouraged the riots; nor was the suggestion proved that a series of attacks on Europeans had been planned for the 13th, and had simply broken out ahead of time.

The Government's Declaration of 13 January

Ten days after the riots the Government's declaration on the future of the Congo was due; obviously it could not be entirely unaffected by the events of the 4th, and it would seem that the riots were instrumental in rallying the Government—not without much hesitation—to M. van Hemelrijck's progressive policy. The declaration was preceded by King Baudouin's radio message. 'It is our firm intention,' he said, 'without undesirable procrastination but also without undue haste, to lead the Congolese populations forward towards independence in prosperity and peace.' The word 'independence' had been taken up in an official pronouncement; this fact alone marked the importance of the new definition of Belgian policy in the Congo. The declaration of the 13th announced the holding of elections for communal and territorial councils by universal suffrage at the end of 1959; these councils were then to elect the Provincial

Councils early in 1960.¹ A *Conseil Général* was to replace the present *Conseil de Gouvernement*, and later to form the House of Representatives, while a *Conseil de Législation* was to be set up, the future Senate. As from March 1959 each Provincial Council was to elect two representatives to sit on the *Conseil de Législation*.

African comments on this declaration were on the whole favourable, since Belgium had announced her intention of according independence, and was preparing the way for internal autonomy by a system of councils elected by universal suffrage; the Congolese noted, however, that the Government declaration remained very vague, and hoped that further information would soon be forthcoming. But the change in tone from previous declarations was striking and encouraging; never before had it been said that Belgium 'intended to organize the Congo as a democracy, capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and of deciding the question of independence for itself'.

Europeans were divided in their comments. There were sharp criticisms from a group of reactionaries at Leopoldville who had tried to set up a 'committee for public safety' after the riots, but other whites of the city signed a motion in which they declared themselves in agreement with the Government's proposals. Some of the settlers in the East were violently critical; at Bukavu, for example, flags flew at half-mast and the shops were closed when M. van Hemelrijck visited the city during his tour of the Congo. The *Fédacol*, the settlers' federation, however, was not as such unfavourable.

¹ The towns were to be divided into communes; in some cases this had already been done for the elections of 1957 and 1958. For the elections in rural areas, the old administrative division of the *territoire* sufficed. For administrative purposes the *territoires* are grouped in districts, but for representative purposes there is to be no intermediate stage between the communes and *territoires* respectively, and the provinces (of which there are six in the Congo).

After the Riots

In Leopoldville the arrested African leaders were tried, but there was insufficient evidence on which to condemn them. Several were released at the end of February, then MM. Pinzi and Diomi early in March. On 14 March Joseph Kasavubu, Daniel Kanza, and Simon Nzeza were flown to Belgium and lodged in a Brussels hotel at Government expense, since it was 'inopportune' to release them in Leopoldville. While in Belgium, it was stressed, they were not to treat with the Government (the Congolese concluded at first that this was the purpose of their visit, and there were anxious representations from various groups asking why they, too, should not have this privilege) but to study Belgian institutions and public life in order to fit them for future responsibilities in the Congo. Meanwhile the Abako, having in vain appealed for United Nations intervention, endeavoured to set up an organization in exile at Brazzaville, under the leadership of M. Kingatolo, and busied itself sending tracts back to Leopoldville demanding autonomy for the Bakongo. By contrast, the Congolese *Jocistes* (Young Christian Workers) set on foot a subscription scheme among the Africans to compensate Europeans whose property had been damaged or destroyed during the riots. Inspired by this, a European subscription was raised to compensate Africans whose homes and property had suffered.

At the same time several new political groups sprang up in Leopoldville; the *Mouvement de Regroupement de Populations du Congo* endeavoured to regroup the Bakongo; the *Inter-fédérale*, which united the non-Bakongo ethnic groups of Leopoldville, began to be active politically, while the *Union Progressiste Congolaise*, the *Parti Démocrate Congolais*, and the *Mouvement pour le progrès national congolais* were at one in putting independence and unity in the forefront of their programmes. In March it was announced that a group of leading Congolese personalities—*bourgmestres*, chiefs, and the representatives of various movements from all parts of

the country—would come to Belgium at the request of the Colonial Minister to discuss government policy. In the Congo itself the first national congress of democratic parties and movements was held in April. As a result of discussions between the *Union Congolaise* and the *Mouvement National Congolais*, it had been agreed that the *Union Congolaise* should organize a congress at Luluabourg at which the various groups from all over the Colony could meet with each other, discuss their aims together, and, if possible, prepare a common programme of action. This was the first time that Africans from all parts of the Congo had come together to discuss their political future. In fact it was impossible to prepare a common programme at this first meeting, but a second congress was announced for later in the summer. The old regional isolation of African movements in the Congo had broken down, just as had the Colony's former isolation from the rest of the continent.

Conclusion

At the end of the War the Congo was just beginning to be less isolated from the rest of Africa, but the old paternalist pattern of things seemed unshaken. When Mrs. Robeson, wife of the American Negro singer, visited Leopoldville in 1947 she was disappointed to find that the *évolués* there did not seem to have the slightest interest in the emancipation of their country.¹ The change came only gradually; the independence of India and even the Bandung Conference aroused very little echo in the Congo. The first awakening came in the economic and social fields, with the demands of the *évolués* for assimilation to European status. They wanted protection against racial discrimination on the part of the Europeans and Belgian citizenship. At the same time they were becoming increasingly aware of outside events; the independence of the Sudan and of Ghana, the French policy in Africa, and finally the conference of independence

¹ A. A. J. van Bilsen, 'La Belgique devant le problème du Congo', *Revue Générale Belge*, February 1959, p. 5.

movements at Accra all had their effect. The desire for assimilation was transformed into a demand for independence; Congolese aspirations had moved on to the political level. Now it was not so much that Africans wanted protection against the racial discrimination of Europeans, as that the Europeans no longer felt at home in the Congo and began to want protection against the Africans. Those with children studying at Belgian universities began to ask themselves whether, after all, it was advisable for them to return to make their careers in Africa. There was no longer any question but that the Congo would become independent; it was possible to dispute ways and means but not the fact itself.

Belgium adopted the system of paternalism because it paid; her reasoning was empirical and her policy practical. Now that it has clearly become impossible to achieve a prosperous, stable, and contented society by these methods, Belgium has changed her policy. The January declaration shows her as remarkably adaptable and flexible. Since the War it has appeared to the Congolese that she has been grudging in the concessions she has made, little by little, to the demands of the *évolués*; there has been no bold, comprehensive planning to prepare the Congo for independence. There is a considerable difference, however, between these piecemeal concessions and the tone of the declaration.

Now the Congolese have been promised their independence, and such a promise cannot be withdrawn. But a declaration has obvious dangers unless it is followed up with reasonable speed. It is still possible to decide on bold action in time, to hand over authority peacefully, to guarantee to the young nation the help of European specialists and technicians, and to Europeans who have made their home in the Congo a voice—though not the deciding voice—in public affairs. But to do this Belgium will have to move fast. It is urgent to prepare an African *élite* capable of governing the country—presumably by study in Europe—and to reduce the educational gap between the

towns and the countryside, so that the rural areas may be qualified to defend their interests in an independent Congo. A Congolese nationality must be created, for the Congolese no longer desire Belgian citizenship, while those non-Belgian whites who have decided to make their home in the Congo must be politically integrated into Congolese society. It will be necessary to work out some form of decentralization of authority, to fix a date for the election of the national councils proposed by the Government declaration of 13 January, and to define their powers. It will be useless, of course, to set up democratic institutions in the Congo if there is no effective freedom of speech. And if there is to be fruitful co-operation and some form of association between Belgium and her former colony in the future, as would seem to be to the advantage of both, all forms of racial discrimination in the Congo must cease.

The January declaration took an important step forward, and this cannot be retraced; the Congo has been promised independence. But how and when this is to come has not yet been decided. The declaration must be followed by a bold and energetic interpretation on Belgium's part, and the co-operation both of Europeans and of Africans to make a reality of the Congolese nation whose existence it heralds.

VI. APRIL 1959 TO 30 JUNE 1960

Belgian Plans for Congo Independence

AFTER the riots in Leopoldville of January 1959, the King's radio speech and the statement of the Minister for the Congo to the Senate on 13 January, mentioning independence for the first time as the ultimate goal, there was a lull in Congolese politics. Most Europeans were rather doubtful, but among the Congolese there was general satisfaction. All through 1959, and until the Round Table Conference of January 1960, the planners were working on a scheme for Congolese elections in 1960, on the same lines as those in Belgium. It was hoped that these would meet nationalist aspirations. In May 1959 a Legislative Council was set up in Brussels, in place of the former Colonial Council. This was intended as a skeleton Senate to advise on the drafting of Bills for the Congo. Plans were also made to bring Congolese students to Belgium for administrative, professional, and technical training. Courses of three to five years were envisaged. The first group arrived early in the year; by May there were about 150 Congolese students in Belgium. A few Africans had entered Belgian universities after visiting the Brussels Exhibition and these were included in the plans. The numbers increased very rapidly. Among them was Joseph Mobutu, a journalist, who went to Brussels in April 1959 for a three-year stay, working for the Congo Information Service.

While the Government emphasized the training of youth, Congolese politicians showed little interest in this aspect of Belgian planning—perhaps regarding the students as future rivals for power—but concentrated their demands on elections and immediate independence. For example,

after the Economic Round Table Conference in Brussels in 1960, when 50 or more Congolese cadets were working in the Belgian Ministries and studying at the Military College, the jealousy of some of the political leaders aroused the antagonism of the young men, who said bluntly that they had not come to Belgium to study the art of administration in order to receive junior posts on their return home, as had been stated by MM. Kashamura and Bomboko.

There was also an up-grading of Africans in administrative posts. For example M. Jean Bolikango became Assistant Commissioner-General of the Information Service in Leopoldville. He had been a schoolteacher for 32 years, and had been public relations officer for the Catholic missions at the Brussels Exhibition. Another appointment was that of M. Hubert Sangara, the chief of a tribe from the province of Kivu, to the Board of Sabena. Meanwhile, in the Congo, the Government set up work camps for unemployed youths, mainly in the province of Leopoldville, and started a scheme for education, employing army volunteers, on the same lines as the French army in Algeria.

Such were the steps taken by the Government in 1959 to prepare the Congolese for self-government; but after the Round Table Conference, when 30 June 1960 was announced as the date for independence, the pace of the preparations increased beyond control, and haste and confusion marked the last six months of Belgian rule.

Ministerial Changes

After the Leopoldville riots M. Cornélis, the Governor-General, wished to resign, but no suitable person could be found who was acceptable to both parties in the Coalition, and willing to undertake the responsibility. In mid-April M. Cornélis was asked to remain. He at least knew the Congo from long years in the country. The Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, M. van Hemelrijck, visited the Congo in June 1959 and had a poor reception from

Europeans, who felt that he was not only pro-African, but also anti-colonial. The Governor-General and the Minister disagreed as to the timetable for advance, and while M. Cornélis was regarded as the protector of the white population, M. van Hemelrijck became the hero of the Congolese. During the summer the Minister was hastening self-government for the Congo at a pace far greater than was approved in Belgium or by his Cabinet colleagues, and at the beginning of September he was forced to resign.

M. van Hemelrijck's place was taken by M. Auguste de Schrijver, a former Minister, who was greatly liked and respected in the Christian Social Party. Insisting that he would abide by the Government declaration of 13 January, the new Minister made very similar proposals to those of his predecessor. In October 1959 he told a Parliamentary Commission that local elections would be held in December, Provincial Councils would be formed in March, and two Legislative Assemblies before the end of 1960. He thought that the first Parliament might last for four years, and would draw up a constitution for the Congo. Outsiders could only be surprised that this statement, which appeared to be in advance of M. van Hemelrijck's proposals, should have been accepted by the Christian Social Party. M. de Schrijver was perhaps able to achieve this advance in the substance of what he offered because in manner and sympathy he appeared essentially reasonable, and in no way anti-European. But he was never popular with the Congolese, who lamented the departure of M. van Hemelrijck. In November 1959, as the work of the Ministry increased, M. Raymond Scheyven was appointed Minister without Portfolio, to deal specially with financial aspects of the Congo reforms. At the beginning of the month M. de Schrijver announced that a Round Table Conference on the Congo would be held. In December he said that this could advance by several months the setting up of central institutions, adding that Belgium must speed up the process towards independence. The Round Table Conference took

place in Brussels by the wish of the Congolese, starting on 20 January 1960.

The Abako and Kasavubu

M. Kasavubu and two other Abako leaders who had been arrested after the Leopoldville riots, and then flown to Brussels in March 1959, returned to Leopoldville in mid-May and were received with great enthusiasm by their followers. The judicial cases against them were closed. In Leopoldville province Abako extremists stirred up the people with demands for immediate independence and a Lower Congo republic, adding shouts for 'Roi' Kasa. As the Minister refused all discussion on this basis, which implied secession, M. Kasavubu avowed that he only wanted a federation for the Congo.

In September the *Parti Solidaire Africain* (P.S.A.), a party of extremists in Leopoldville, led by M. Antoine Gizenga, sent the Minister a plan for a federal republic. The P.S.A. became the ally of the Abako and, at this period, was opposed to the *Mouvement National Congolais* (M.N.C.) of M. Lumumba, which had always insisted on a unitary state.

M. Kasavubu reiterated his demands for immediate independence, threatening that otherwise the Abako would boycott the local elections of December, and later he insisted that these should be postponed until after the Round Table Conference. Near the end of November the branch of the M.N.C. led by M. Albert Kalonji, which opposed M. Lumumba, formed a cartel with the Abako and the P.S.A., backing up M. Kasavubu's threat of a boycott, and they published a joint memorandum demanding a united but federal Congo. At the beginning of December the three leaders of the cartel went to Brussels to try to persuade M. de Schrijver to postpone the local elections. Almost daily they published communiqués of great length; one day they would break off negotiations, while on the next they would continue their talks with the

Ministers. When the local elections took place in December as arranged, only the Abako abstained, the other partners in the cartel deciding not to carry out their threat of a boycott. In the other five provinces from 80 to 90 per cent. of the voters went to the polls, but in the city of Leopoldville 30 per cent., and in the Lower Congo region only about 15 per cent. voted. By the end of the year the Abako extremists were saying that they would not recognize Belgian authority after January; but at the Kisantu conference, at the end of December, when the election results had been published, M. Kasavubu made a moderate speech, demanding a federal state, but saying that he expected independence to be granted immediately after the Round Table Conference.

The Mouvement National Congolais and Lumumba

The Luluabourg conference, called by the Congolese leaders in April 1959, was the first to include almost all the political parties. It was dominated by the M.N.C. and by its leader, M. Patrice Lumumba, flanked by MM. Ilunga and Kalonji, the M.N.C. leaders in Kasai. Although the conference was tempestuous the resolutions were moderate, and a telegram was sent to the King thanking him for his declaration of 13 January. One resolution demanded a Congolese government by January 1961, another dealt with the rights of free speech, while a third insisted on the unity of the Congo—although on this point there were six abstentions.

The M.N.C. regretted the resignation of M. van Hemelrijck, considering that M. de Schrijver was too conservative, and at the end of September M. Lumumba sent an open letter to the Minister saying that his party would no longer co-operate with the Belgians. At the M.N.C. conference in Stanleyville at the end of October he demanded negotiations for immediate independence; otherwise, he said, 1960 would be a year of misery and war. Like M. Kasavubu he said he would boycott the local elections

unless they were postponed. M. Lumumba told his party to follow his directions for civil disobedience, and not to co-operate with the Belgians. Thus they would achieve their goal of immediate independence. This speech was at once followed by riots in Stanleyville, leading to the death of twenty Congolese and M. Lumumba's arrest. Just after the Round Table Conference began M. Lumumba was sentenced to six months in prison; but as all the Congolese delegates demanded his release, the Government, rather than risk the failure of the conference, had him flown to Brussels.

The Baluba and the Lulua

The conflict in Kasai between the Baluba and the Lulua, which was later to intensify and contribute so much to the prevailing chaos, came into the open during 1959.

The Baluba were among the tribes in the Eastern Congo who fled from the Arab slave traders; they settled in South Kasai and North Katanga. The Lulua, at that time the largest tribe in Kasai, allowed them to occupy land near Luluabourg, which later became the provincial capital, and in the unfertile diamond area of Bakwanga. The Lulua, a warlike tribe, were shy of foreigners, and did not come forward readily to receive the benefits of civilization; but the Baluba, no longer fearing the slave traders, became clerks and employees in Luluabourg and worked in the diamond mines. They flourished and multiplied, so that by 1959 they were considerably more numerous than their hosts.

As Belgian authority began to relax in 1959 the Lulua became frightened at the prospect of elections with universal suffrage, which would place them at a disadvantage with the Baluba, whom they had hitherto merely tolerated. At the end of June they sent a letter to the Provincial Governor demanding, among other things, that he should recognize their ownership rights in the Lulua lands which for the last decades had been occupied by the Baluba and

other tribes. In July trouble flared up among the tribesmen, the Lulua attacking Baluba villages, and there was a strike of Baluba in Luluabourg.

In October more serious trouble arose and twenty Baluba were killed. For the next three months there were constant outbreaks, the Lulua pursuing the Baluba with spears, poisoned arrows and old-fashioned rifles, while the latter crowded into the town of Luluabourg. In October 1,200 Baluba were homeless, their villages and crops burnt; by the end of the year the number had trebled. In December the Governor proclaimed martial law in Kasai, and a conciliatory commission was set up. In January Lulua and Baluba chiefs signed an agreement at Lake Mukamba, having decided that the Baluba should leave the Lulua lands which they had occupied, but that in the town of Luluabourg there should be no pressure on the Baluba to go away. The Baluba representatives in Leopoldville did not consent, and M. Cornélis refused to allow 90,000 Baluba to be moved from their homes within two months, leaving their unharvested crops behind. Tribal disturbances continued at intervals in Kasai, and even before independence day arrived several hundred people had been killed in the region of Luluabourg.

The Mouvement National Congolais—Kalonji Branch

Of the two M.N.C. leaders in the Kasai one, M. Alphonse Ilunga, was a Lulua, the other, M. Albert Kalonji, a Baluba, and they and their party became involved in this inter-tribal conflict. At the Luluabourg conference in April 1959 M. Lumumba told the two leaders that they must be reconciled and they shook hands amid the cheers of the gathering. In July M. Kalonji and two of his aides were arrested and accused of inciting racial hatred. M. Lumumba came to Luluabourg to protest about the arrests, announcing dramatically that he would remain in the town until Baluba and Lulua were reconciled.

M. Kalonji was released from arrest in September, and

very soon afterwards he quarrelled with M. Lumumba, whom he accused of bringing forward the opening of the M.N.C. conference at Stanleyville at the end of October 1959, while M. Kalonji was in Brussels. In his absence M. Lumumba produced a declaration from the Kasai delegation disowning M. Kalonji's leadership. M. Kalonji then arrived, at the end of the conference, and announced that the earlier declaration was invalid. He said that he alone represented the M.N.C. in Kasai. Another M.N.C. conference would be held in Elisabethville, he added, and he invited the delegates (including M. Lumumba) to attend it. This trivial quarrel was important for the future alignment of the political parties, particularly because of the geographical position of Kasai between Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

As the Belgians arrested M. Lumumba after the riots following this Stanleyville conference, he was unable to go to Elisabethville, even if he had so desired. Although M. Kalonji demanded the release of M. Lumumba, his protestations rang rather hollow. At the M.N.C. conference in Elisabethville there was also a demand for immediate independence; but irresponsible speeches and actions were condemned as being likely to cause trouble for the responsible leaders. The delegates, while approving of the plan for local elections, stipulated that these should be preceded by a Round Table Conference, to be held in Brussels, at which Congolese political leaders and Belgian Members of Parliament should be present.

A few weeks after this Elisabethville conference the M.N.C.-Kalonji (as it was now called) formed a cartel with the Abako and the P.S.A. Since the Lumumba section demanded a unitary state, while the Kasai branch had cast in its lot with the federalists, this made certain the division of the M.N.C. It also encouraged the Lulua to be on the side of M. Lumumba, because their enemies, the Baluba in Kasai, led by M. Kalonji, were in the opposite camp. The Elisabethville conference was of further importance because

it was held with the tacit consent of M. Tshombe, president of the Conakat party, and was the first sign of a Kalonji-Tshombe alliance.

The Conakat and Tshombe

The *Confédération des Associations Ethniques du Katanga* (Conakat) became a political party in July 1959. M. Moïse Tshombe, belonging to the family of Lunda chiefs, was elected president. The party included Europeans among its members and was the most Western-looking of all the parties in the Congo. Although the tribal chiefs were still regarded with respect in Katanga, the mining industry had greatly spread material prosperity, and in the South particularly had created a more democratic community. All Katangese had a common aim, in that they wanted a greater share of the wealth from their mining industry to be spent in Katanga than had been the case in the past. Only one of the tribes in Katanga—the Baluba—were to be found in other provinces of the Congo; but the most important tribes spread over the borders into Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. The Conakat party assembled all the largest tribes except the Baluba.

M. Tshombe had always rejected the idea of a strong central government and favoured a loose confederation, and when the Abako, P.S.A., and M.N.C.-Kalonji formed their cartel at the end of 1959, there appeared the first lining up of the federalists, M. Kalonji forming a loose link between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. The P.S.A. joined the Lumumba camp after the Round Table Conference, but the rest of this alliance lasted long after the date of independence.

The Baluba in Katanga

The Baluba in Katanga played a very different part from those in Kasai. The province has the smallest population—one and a half million. Possibly one-quarter or one-third of these are Baluba, but no accurate statistics are

available. They remained strangers, however, and the other large tribes—the Lunda and Bemba particularly—formed a common front in the Conakat. Katanga never had enough labour for its growing industry and needed the Baluba, but they were always kept down as much as possible, the Katangese reserving the best positions for themselves. When unemployment became acute, from 1958 onwards, it was the Baluba who suffered first, and many were sent back to their villages. But their numbers remained large in all industrial centres. Unlike their fellow tribesmen in Kasai, who considered themselves much more civilized than the Lulua, the Baluba in Katanga felt inferior beside the Katangese. They had all the grievances of the under dog, and as M. Kalonji (although a fellow Baluba) appeared to be the ally of M. Tshombe, whom they regarded as their oppressor, they were also against M. Kalonji. M. Lumumba, on the other hand, had two merits in their eyes—that he was opposed to M. Tshombe, and that he was regarded as the friend of the Russians and the Communists. Thus he was clearly the leader for the oppressed Baluba of Katanga.

The Parti National du Progrès

At Coquilhatville, capital of Equator province, in mid-November 1959, there was a meeting of delegates from 25 small parties, coming from all six provinces. They wished to form a centre party, which would include Europeans, and claimed to represent five million Congolese who desired to attain independence without civil disobedience and violence. The *Parti National du Progrès* (P.N.P.) was formed and M. Paul Bolya was elected president. As a prelude to the Round Table Conference, in face of the strength of the M.N.C. and the Abako cartel, the P.N.P. allied itself with the Conakat, the other pro-Western party in the Congo, which also demanded decentralization and a federal structure for the Congo. It was natural that the moderation of this new party should find favour with the

administration and they were given a large representation at the Round Table Conference.

King Baudouin's Visit to the Congo

On 17 December King Baudouin, accompanied by M. de Schrijver, left Brussels unexpectedly for a fortnight's visit to the Congo. He went to all the provinces, as well as to Ruanda-Urundi, and was courteously, although sometimes rather noisily, received by the Congolese. The King had frank and friendly talks with African leaders, and in Leopoldville MM. Kasavubu and Kalonji told him that they wanted immediate independence. After his return to Belgium the King said in a broadcast that all the Congolese with whom he had talked desired a large measure of provincial autonomy. M. Lumumba was not included, for he was in prison awaiting trial.

The Round Table Conference

The Round Table Conference began in Brussels on 20 January and lasted for a month. The most spectacular developments, culminating in the announcement of the date for independence, took place during the first week. The rest of the time was spent relatively uneventfully, in discussion and decisions on details.

On the Belgian side there were three Ministers and ten Members of Parliament from all parties except the Communist, with an equal number of reserve delegates. The representation for the Congolese parties had been decided by the Governor primarily on the results of the local elections of the previous month. There were 44 Congolese delegates, with 38 reserves. The Abako cartel (which included the M.N.C.-Kalonji and the P.S.A.) had eleven, and the P.N.P. the same number. The latter had done very well at the elections while the Abako had boycotted them—hence the unexpected equality of delegates. M. Lumumba having been in prison at the time, his M.N.C. had not fared very well at the polls, and only had two delegates.

M. Tshombe, who complained that two were insufficient for the Conakat, was allowed a third delegate. There were eleven representatives from the chiefs; the other six delegates came from small parties. At this period the Abako cartel was regarded as the most extreme, and three delegates from small parties could be classed beside them. The P.N.P. was known to be moderate and three more delegates would be on their side. The tribal representatives were conservative, likewise the Conakat, while the M.N.C.-Lumumba was not regarded as dangerous without its leader.

At this time the Belgian fear was of the breaking up of the Congo, and the fulfilment of the Abako dream of a Lower Congo republic stretching into Angola and the French Congo. In the background was the further fear of Katanga leaving the Congo and becoming an independent state, which would disrupt the Congo economy. Of the Congolese parties only the M.N.C.-Lumumba desired a really strong central government. The others wanted decentralization and differing measures of provincial autonomy.

Events, however, confounded all predictions. On 27 January it was announced that independence would begin on 30 June, which was a compromise between 1 June, demanded by the Congolese, and the end of July, which the Government first offered. On the second day of the conference M. Lumumba was sentenced to six months' imprisonment in Stanleyville for inciting the riots at the end of October; but all the Congolese delegates, as well as the Belgian Socialists, demanded his release, and his party refused to take part in the conference until he was free. M. Lumumba was taken from prison and arrived in Brussels on 26 January.

At first M. Kasavubu was regarded as the chief Congolese leader, but he wished the conference to frame a constitution which would be binding on the Government, and when the Belgians refused this, he walked out and completely

disappeared on the day before M. Lumumba arrived. Rumour said that M. Kasavubu was jealous of M. Lumumba, but sudden tempers had always characterized his political career, and he was liable to disappear when he thought fit whether M. Lumumba was there or not. The cartel appointed M. Nguvulu (*Parti du Peuple*) as their leader, and when M. Kasavubu returned, towards the end of the conference, he made no attempt to resume leadership.

Meanwhile the dramatic arrival of M. Lumumba, showing the manacle wounds on his wrists, stole the thunder from M. Kasavubu's exit. Partly because of his personal domination over the other Congolese delegates, but also because he desired a strong central government in the Congo, which was the aim of the Belgians, M. Lumumba became the central figure and acknowledged leader of the Africans.

The conference had begun with various procedural disagreements. Some of the delegations wanted foreign advisers, but these were finally disallowed. Just before the conference began the Congolese published a joint communiqué saying that their aim was immediate independence, and they wished the decisions of the conference to be binding for Belgium. The Government, however, insisted that all resolutions must be voted by Parliament, and the Congolese acquiesced.

When announcing the date of independence M. de Schrijver recommended a united Congo with decentralization of public services and a large measure of provincial autonomy. As M. Lumumba was now in control, and he had always stood for a unitary state, all the delegates except those of the Conakat accepted the Minister's proposals. M. Tshombe, on the other hand, before, during, and after the conference, always insisted on a federal structure, and repeated that the Congo must remain linked with Belgium. On 31 January M. de Schrijver announced that the two countries would negotiate as equals, and on

10 February M. Lilar, Deputy Prime Minister, stated that the Congo would have full sovereignty without reservations. The conference had previously divided into two commissions, one to consider the structure of the future state, and the other to decide upon the form of the elections.

Sixteen resolutions were passed by the conference, including guarantees of individual freedom, and guarantees for all persons and their property. It was stated that all were equal before the law. The powers of the central and provincial governments were defined. There had been great concessions on the part of the Belgians, but the Congolese, on their side, had agreed that King Baudouin should remain Head of State until independence day, and after the legislative elections to be held in May, that he should nominate the first *formateur* and the first Congolese Government. The new Head of the State would be chosen by the two Houses of Parliament, in common session, until a constitution had been adopted. In case of disagreement the President of the Senate, or of the Chamber, would be Head of State. The first Parliament would be a Constituent Assembly and there would be two Houses. This Assembly would sit at Luluabourg and French would be the official language. The first Parliament was to last for at least three, and not more than four, years. To draw up the constitution the two Chambers would sit together and a two-thirds majority would be needed for each article. It was decided how many representatives each province should send to Parliament, and that voting would be compulsory, on a universal suffrage and with proportional representation.

The conference decided that an Economic Round Table Conference should take place in April in Brussels, and a resolution assured Belgian technical aid and capital for the new state. Guarantees were given to Belgian civil servants by the Government and by the Congolese. On 10 February M. de Schrijver proposed that a treaty of friendship between Belgium and the Congo should be

signed before 1 July. When the conference ended M. Tshombe made a solemn promise that the Conakat would guarantee the capital invested in Katanga.

The Round Table Conference gave the Congolese far more than they can have expected. The Belgians had no bargaining points left on the political side but pinned their hopes to the future economic conference, realizing that the Congolese would need guidance in this sphere for several years to come.

The Basic Law for the Congo

The sixteen resolutions of the Round Table Conference, including that which specified the form of the Congo elections, were embodied in Bills which were adopted almost unanimously by the Belgian Parliament in March and May 1960, and became known as the *Loi Fondamentale*. By the time it came before Parliament this ran to 253 articles, covering 91 pages. It is open to question whether the Congolese understood this lengthy law any better than the somewhat untidy resolutions of the conference. Some of these were put into practice before independence—for example the executive college comprising six Congolese and the Governor-General was installed in Leopoldville in March 1960, and three Congolese were appointed for each province to work with the Provincial Governors. A political commission with six Congolese members was also set up in Brussels, to work beside the Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. This last was expected to prepare a draft for a future constitution.

Party Alignments and Divisions in 1960

When the delegates returned to the Congo after the Round Table Conference, new combinations and divisions appeared among the political parties. M. Lumumba's branch of the M.N.C. tried to join up again with M. Kalonji's branch, but this alliance hardly lasted a month.

One of M. Lumumba's lieutenants, M. Nendaka, broke away, declaring that his chief had received money from the Belgian Communist Party, and formed another dissident branch of the M.N.C. Conflict arose between the extremists of the Abako, led by M. Daniel Kanza, who continued to demand a republic of the Lower Congo, and the moderates behind M. Kasavubu, who agreed to a federal Congo. The leaders dismissed each other from office, but party members took little notice and adhered to the side which was strongest in their locality. The P.S.A., led by MM. Gizenga and Kamitatu, left the Abako cartel, saying that they had only joined it in order to attain independence. This was important as M. Gizenga now left the federalist camp, and veered towards M. Lumumba's view of a strong central government.

Disturbances and Riots before the Legislative Elections

Party manoeuvring before the elections of May was accompanied by indiscipline and disturbances in various parts of the territory. Belgian authority was flouted; in the Lower Congo taxes were unpaid and medical regulations ignored. Police and *gendarmérie* were attacked and were inclined to disappear in face of trouble. Only the *Force Publique*, when called out, ensured any kind of order. The Lulua and Baluba continued to fight in spite of agreements signed by their chiefs, and their conflicts spread also to Leopoldville, where many Baluba were employed.

M. Lumumba addressed a meeting in Elisabethville in the middle of March, demanding immediate independence. Afterwards fighting broke out between his supporters in Katanga, known as the Balubakat (although this included many who were not Baluba), and the Conakat, the most important party in Katanga, which disliked violence and was pro-Western in outlook. Seven people were killed, over 100 injured, and 600 arrested; martial law was in force for a short time. In spite of the protests of M. Kalonji, M. Lumumba held a meeting at Luluabourg at the

beginning of April, and he was supported by the *Lulua-frères*, with whom he now made a firm alliance, opposing M. Kalonji and his Baluba of Kasai. As the elections approached the disturbances increased. In the Stanleyville region M. Lumumba defied all Belgian authority, shouting more noisily than ever for independence at once—the parrot cry of the last year—while his followers toured the province in lorries and terrorized the inhabitants all through the election period.

Reinforcement of Belgian Troops in the Congo

In order to combat these disorders Belgium decided to send more troops to the Congo, and in May some were removed from Germany and flown out to the army base of Kamina. M. Lumumba at once demanded that all Belgian troops should be sent home, alleging that their presence was an affront to the *Force Publique*, who were quite capable of keeping order in the Congo. He and M. Kashamura (who belonged to a party of left-wing extremists in Kivu province) said that they would not take their seats in the Governor-General's executive college until the Congo had its own government. M. Bolikango, president of the newly-formed *Parti de l'Unité Nationale* (P.U.N.A.), insisted that the Belgian troops should stay, saying that this was the wish of all moderate opinion in the Congo. (M. Bolikango had first been president of the anti-Abako party in Leopoldville, which brought together the tribes of the Upper Congo (the Bangala), and was known as the *Association des Ressortissants du Haut Congo* (Assoreco). Under this name it was represented at the Round Table Conference, but soon afterwards it was absorbed by the P.U.N.A., M. Bolikango's new party in Equator province. There was little to choose between the policies of this party and those of the P.N.P., for neither desired that independence should be accompanied by violence; but there was no agreement between the leaders.)

Ruanda-Urundi

Troop reinforcements had become essential in 1959 because of tribal fighting in Ruanda-Urundi. This Trust Territory came under Belgian administration after the First World War, having previously been a part of German East Africa. It lies to the north-east of Lake Tanganyika and has a population of four and a half million, much denser than the Congo, which, over forty times as large, has only 13 million inhabitants. The climate is better, the people are healthier and, perhaps for this reason, rather better educated and more advanced than the Congolese. There is a little poor quality tin, but the majority of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture. Cattle and coffee are the most important products. Compared with the Congo the territory is very poor, and as the Belgians provided the same medical and social services, and taxation returns were small, Ruanda-Urundi proved a costly burden for Brussels.

The Belgians administered the country through the chiefs, who belonged to the Watutsi, a Nilotic warrior tribe, which had conquered the Bantu inhabitants. They are very tall and thin, with poor physique, have not fought for many years, and are probably incapable of working. They own large herds of cattle. The large majority of the population are Bahutu, a Bantu tribe, living by agriculture, who provide the food and do the work, usually being described as serfs. The Watutsi are only about 12 per cent. of the population, and the Batwa, a pygmy-like people whom the Watutsi employ as domestic slaves, are about one per cent.

The most important chief, the Mwami of Ruanda, Charles Mutara Rudahigwa, died suddenly in July 1959, in a Belgian hospital at Usumbura, at the age of 48. Rumour spread that he had died an unnatural death, and in some quarters the Belgians were suspected, although he had followed his father, whom the Belgians had deposed, and was a very loyal friend to Belgium. The tribesmen

chose their new Mwami, who was known as Kigeri V, for themselves. The Belgians were not consulted, but accepted the *fait accompli*. From this time on, however, there was increasing unrest in Ruanda, which turned into serious tribal fighting at the beginning of November 1959. The Bahutu, although so numerous in comparison with their masters, feared that if the Belgians withdrew their servile position would be harder than ever. The Mwami Charles Mutara had been very progressive and had introduced reforms in favour of the Bahutu; but they disliked the new Mwami, Kigeri, whom they considered to be a reactionary. The Watutsi, on the other hand, feared elections with universal suffrage, which would probably be the end of all their privileges.

Belgian troops were flown to Stanleyville in November, and then sent to Ruanda. These were later joined by paratroops. But it was the *Force Publique* which mainly had to deal with the Hutu tribesmen, who sacked and burnt the Tutsi villages. The nature of the country made military operations very difficult, and in the rainy season the high-growing crops sheltered the attackers, who could not be spotted from the air. King Baudouin had asked both Mwami to visit him in November 1959, but only the Mwami of Urundi accepted the invitation, Mwami Kigeri replying, very courteously, that he could not leave his country at such a troubled time. This refusal was perfectly understood in Brussels, although it caused unfavourable comment in the Congo. In November, when the Bahutu first attacked the Watutsi, the latter fled to the Catholic missions. Hundreds were killed and maimed, and as the missionaries could do very little to help, many Watutsi crossed the frontier into Uganda, driving their cattle before them. These migrations into Uganda, where there are related tribes, continued at intervals for the next six months. After the arrival of the troops the tribal fighting was on a smaller scale, but the burning of huts and looting continued up to the date of Congolese independence.

On 10 November 1959 M. de Schrijver had told Parliament that Ruanda-Urundi would have self-government in the following year, but this declaration did not assuage the fears of the tribesmen. Each side accused the other of responsibility for the troubles. Various political parties appeared in Ruanda-Urundi, only one of which supported the feudal chiefs. None of the parties had affiliations with those in the Congo. The fighting was confined to Ruanda, and it may be that the unpopularity of the Mwami Kigeri was one of the causes of the outbreak. In May 1960 the three democratic parties in Ruanda demanded that he should be deposed, and these represented the great majority of the inhabitants.

In March 1960 a United Nations Commission paid a four weeks' visit to the Trust Territory. They recommended that elections should be held early in 1961, after a Round Table Conference in Brussels, which should take place during the summer, and that independence should be granted during 1961.

The Economic Round Table Conference

The Economic Conference for the Congo, planned at the Round Table Conference in January, opened in Brussels on 26 April, continuing until 16 May. It did not appeal to the Congolese as had the January conference. The party leaders were mainly incapable of understanding economic affairs—at times the young Congolese students had to be called upon to explain the Belgian proposals—nor were they interested in the setting up of commissions for the future. They were immensely excited about their provincial and legislative elections, which were to be held in May, and wanted to be in the Congo to conduct their electoral campaigns. When the Belgians tried to explain the difficult financial situation of the Congo, the budget deficit, the growing national debt, the decrease in investment from overseas, the Africans hardly seemed to listen. Belgium had promised to lend money and they hoped to have the

pleasure of spending it. All the conference achieved was a series of resolutions to be placed before the Congolese Parliament in due course. Possibly only M. Tshombe was awake to what was going on, and he had his own ideas and said very little. He demanded provincial autonomy in economic matters, investment, development funds, and the like, and he avoided the question of taxation. He did not want shareholders who had invested funds in Katanga to lose confidence in their holdings, and he was supported in this by the other Katanga delegates, including those of the Balubakat, his political opponents.

Transfer of Funds from the Congo

Apart from the budget deficit of recent years, the most serious economic problem was the transfer of funds from the Congo. From the beginning of 1960 many Belgians left the Congo and took their money with them, as far as they could realize it. Others, who remained, had been sending money home ever since the Leopoldville riots of the year before. The Congo Central Bank had to draw heavily on its reserves, which decreased by five milliard francs in fourteen months. In February an agreement that money should not be transferred was reached between the large companies and the Government in order to restore confidence. But this did not affect private persons, and the flight of capital was so great that, at the end of March, Belgium placed restrictions on transfer, limiting very severely the amount which private persons could send out of the Congo each month.

General Elections in the Congo

Provincial and general elections took place in the Congo in May 1960, under a system of proportional representation. The following table shows the resulting composition of the Lower House of Parliament, broken down into parties and provinces.

M.N.C.-Lumumba, with its associated small parties,

won 49 of the 137 seats. M. Lumumba gained seats in all provinces but Katanga, but here his ally, the Balubakat,

Parties		Leopoldville	Equator	Orientale	Kivu	Katanga	Kasai	Total
A (Total seats: 49)	M.N.C.-Lumumba	1	2	21	6	—	6	36
	U.N.C.	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
	Coaka	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
	Balubakat with Allies	—	—	—	—	6	—	6
		—	—	—	—	2	—	2
B (27)	Abako	12	—	—	—	—	—	12
	M.N.C.-Kalonji	—	—	—	—	—	8	8
	Conakat	—	—	—	—	7	—	7
C (28)	P.N.P.	4	4	3	—	—	3	14
	P.U.N.A.	—	7	—	—	—	—	7
	R.E.K.O.	—	—	—	4	—	—	4
	A.R.P.	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
	Tribal chiefs	—	—	—	1	1	—	2
D (23)	P.S.A.	13	—	—	—	—	—	13
	C.E.R.E.A.	—	—	—	10	—	—	10
E	Various local	3	5	1	1	—	—	10
	Total	33	18	25	23	16	22	137

M.N.C.	Mouvement National Congolais
U.N.C.	Union Nationale Congolaise
Coaka	Coalition Kasai (small tribes)
Balubakat	Baluba in Katanga (with some other small tribes)
Abako	Association des Bas Congo
Conakat	Confédération des Associations Ethniques du Katanga
P.N.P.	Parti National du Progrès
P.U.N.A.	Parti de l'Unité Nationale
R.E.K.O.	Regroupement (or Rassemblement) Ethnique de Kivu
A.R.P.	Alliance Rurale Progressiste
P.S.A.	Parti Solidaire Africain
C.E.R.E.A.	Centre de Regroupement Africain

won eight. In his own stronghold, Orientale, he won 21 seats. The only other party which won seats in more than one province was the P.N.P., but they did not do so well as in the local elections held six months earlier.

The table divides the parties into five groups. Group A, that of M. Lumumba and his allies, were pan-African and insisted on a unitary state with a strong central government. This was much the largest group. The second, Group B, including Abako and Conakat, wanted a federal state, preferably with a weak central government. These two parties were suspected of favouring secession, and as their fellow tribesmen were spread well over the frontiers, their loyalty to the Congo was considered doubtful. Group C included all the moderate elements in the Congo that desired order, and transition to independence without violence. They all wanted decentralization and could be classed as mildly federalist; they represented the rural areas more than did the other groups. Group D was composed of two parties regarded as very left-wing; several of their leaders had had contact with Communist parties abroad. They were expected to back M. Lumumba at first, and could be considered as pan-African in outlook; but prophecy was dangerous as their course depended on personal rivalries. MM. Gizenga and Kashamura (of the P.S.A. and C.E.R.E.A. respectively) were said to be avid for power, and could be expected to make a hard bargain for their support. Group E, representing small local interests, could be ignored.

M. Lumumba's great electoral success was due to his technique for publicity. M. Kasavubu might be well-known in Brazzaville, but M. Lumumba was known in Accra, where he had met leaders of other African nationalist parties, and this added to his prestige. While M. Kasavubu knew the leaders of the other parties, he had not organized meetings which appealed to the masses in other provinces but his own, Leopoldville. M. Lumumba's loud-speaker vans had been seen and heard in all parts of the Congo, even penetrating as far afield as Usumbura. As an orator he far outstripped his rivals. Except for the M.N.C.-Lumumba, all the parties were localized, and those that gained seats in more than one province, like the P.N.P.,

were combinations of small parties. M. Lumumba, himself detribalized, appealed to thousands who were in the same position, working—or unemployed—in the towns. None of his lieutenants enjoyed any similar popularity.

Forming a Congolese Government

In May M. Ganshof van der Meersch was appointed Minister-Resident in the Congo, and his main function was to form the new government. He was regarded as a wise and strong man, but he had no experience of Africa. It was hoped that he would uphold authority during the difficult transition period between the elections and independence. A more exacting mission could hardly be imagined. 92367

Electoral success went to M. Lumumba's head and, after a stormy meeting with M. Ganshof van der Meersch on 2 June, he held a press conference and demanded the immediate departure of Belgian troops and of the Minister-Resident. He claimed that the Head of State should be elected by a direct vote, and not by the two Houses of Parliament, as had been decided at the Round Table Conference in January, and that the Prime Minister should come from the party with the largest number of seats in the Lower House—the M.N.C.-Lumumba—from which he proposed to form a government. As this party had gained less than 30 per cent. of the seats it could easily have been defeated by a concerted opposition. With his allies, however, he might control three of the provincial governments, Kasai and possibly Kivu as well as his own Orientale. He held another meeting in Leopoldville on 5 June, when he criticized Belgium for not having trained Congolese for administrative and diplomatic posts, complaining bitterly that the Congo would attain sovereignty while the *Sûreté*, magistrature, police and army were in European hands.

While the Abako was announcing the formation of an independent government in Leopoldville, and Katanga was threatening to secede, M. Ganshof van der Meersch, on

14 June, asked M. Lumumba to try to form a coalition government. Within 48 hours his first attempt had failed. On 17 June the two Houses of Parliament met for the first time, and the Minister-Resident asked M. Kasavubu to try and compose a government. The Abako leader announced on 19 June that he had formed a cabinet combining all parties except the M.N.C.-Lumumba; but now it was the turn of M. Lumumba to say that he was forming a rival, and truly independent, government. On 20 June, however, M. Lumumba agreed to a compromise, announcing that he would be willing for M. Kasavubu to be Head of State, provided he himself was the Prime Minister. On the following day he was asked officially to form a government. M. Kasongo (M.N.C.-Lumumba) was elected President of the Lower House, and the two Vice-Presidents came from the two extreme parties—P.S.A. and C.E.R.E.A.—which were now supporting M. Lumumba. In the Senate, however, M. Joseph Ileo (M.N.C.-Kalonji) was elected President. On 23 June M. Lumumba announced the names of his Cabinet, and these came from all party groups save that of his rival, the M.N.C.-Kalonji. Both Houses of Parliament gave M. Lumumba a vote of confidence. On 24 June Parliament elected M. Kasavubu to be Head of State. The Abako leader at once invited King Baudouin to come to Leopoldville for Independence Day, and when the King arrived on 29 June he was welcomed warmly by M. Kasavubu and the crowd. But shouts of *Vive le Roi* were often drowned by cries of *Vive Kasa, notre Roi*.

The Katanga Emergency

In Katanga voting for the Provincial Government had provided the Conakat (M. Tshombe's party) with a narrow majority in the Provincial Assembly, and as the Basic Law decreed that a two-thirds majority was needed in order to elect the Senators and the Government, the Balubakat, in opposition, could obstruct any advance by staying away. M. de Schrijver put forward an amendment

to the Basic Law to enable Provincial Senators and Governments to be elected by a simple majority. This threat decided the Balubakat to cease boycotting the assembly, but in order to avoid similar obstruction in the future, the Conakat said that Katanga would secede unless the Belgian Parliament voted for the amendment. The Belgians did not at all want the wealthy mining province to secede, and so on 15 June they adopted the amendment. When M. Lumumba's Government was announced M. Tshombe complained that the Conakat had been promised the Ministry of National Defence, and this had been given to one of the M.N.C.-Lumumba. On 29 June M. Tshombe declared Katanga to be an independent state, to which the Governor replied by threatening to arrest the whole Katanga Cabinet, and to proclaim martial law. This sobered M. Tshombe, who then said that he only wanted provincial autonomy within a federal Congo, as he had declared over and over again. After these exchanges Independence Day passed off quietly in Elisabethville with a parade of the *Force Publique*.

Treaty of Friendship with Belgium

On 29 June a Treaty of Friendship, Assistance, and Technical Aid was signed in Leopoldville, MM. Lumumba and Bomboko signing for the Congo, and MM. Eyskens and de Schrijver for Belgium. It included an agreement that the Belgian military bases in the Congo should for the time being remain in Belgian hands. Up to the time of writing this treaty had not been rescinded.

Belgium's Hasty Withdrawal from the Congo

Belgium has been severely criticized for giving independence to the Congo before the people were ready for responsibility. Professor van Bilsen, who was adviser to M. Kasavubu, declared at the beginning of April that the Congo was becoming independent with three grave handicaps—a lack of *élites*, a lack of political experience,

and a bad economic situation. This was the same Professor who, a few years before, had published a plan—then regarded as completely revolutionary—for independence for the Congo in 30 years' time.

For so small a country as Belgium, without any previous colonial experience, her achievement in the Congo was amazing. Its health service was regarded as the best in Africa. She had transformed an unhealthy swamp and provided a good system of transport for the Congo's exports. Elementary education was more widespread than in other Central, West, and East African territories, and there was a fair amount of good secondary and technical education. A large number of Congolese could speak French. It was not so much university education as political experience, as mentioned by Professor van Bilsen, and training in administration and business which the Congolese lacked.

Constant criticism of colonialism worried Belgium unduly, for she liked to think of herself as a model character in international affairs. Pressure in the United Nations, pressure from the newly independent countries in Africa—particularly the French and, to a lesser extent, the British former colonies, pressure from the Belgian Socialist Party, all combined to destroy her self-confidence. It is often said that Belgium left the Congo to itself because she became frightened at the constant budget deficit and growing national debt in the colony. The Leopoldville riots had produced a lack of confidence abroad and dried up new investment and, added to the Congo's debts, made Belgium fear financial disaster. She would have been prepared to face the economic difficulties in an orderly Congo, but she dared not risk the financial losses occasioned by disorder. The French war in Algeria was ever before Belgian eyes, and the Government knew well that the people, although they now criticize their Ministers, would have complained even more bitterly had they been asked to continue to rule the Congo by force.

Printed by litho and made at the Pitman Press, Bath

WITHDRAWN
UNIV OF MOUNT UNION LIBRARY

967.5 S631b

Slade, Ruth M./The Belgian Congo



3 7048 00136 8204

967.5-S631b

92367

AUTHOR

Slade, Ruth M

967.5-S631b

DATE DUE

92367

NOV 25 1962

NOV 14 1963

JEB 28 '64

NOV 19 '64

MAY 13 1970

APR 23 1980

DEC 1980

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

The first edition of Dr Slade's book, *The Belgian Congo*, published in February 1960, described developments in the Congo from the end of the war up to January 1959, the month of the Leopoldville riots and the announcement of the Belgian intention 'without undesirable procrastination but also without undue haste to lead the Congolese population forward towards independence in prosperity and peace'. In the second edition Mrs Marjory Taylor, a student for many years of both Belgian and African affairs, takes the story up to the date of independence, showing briefly how far and why these plans went astray.

uniform with this book

TRAGEDY IN ALGERIA

By GERARD MANSELL 6s. net

LATIN AMERICA

By J. HALCRO FERGUSON 7s. 6d. net

SOUTH AFRICA AND WORLD OPINION

By PETER CALVOCORESSI 6s. net

SOUTH AFRICA:

TWO VIEWS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

By S. PIENAAR and ANTHONY SAMPSON 5s. net

RACIAL PROBLEMS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA

By GEOFFREY WHEELER 6s. net

KENYA: THE TENSIONS OF PROGRESS

By SUSAN WOOD 6s. net

*These prices are operative in the United Kingdom only
and are subject to alteration without notice*

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Price 6s. net



T2-ERI-271

